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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright law has an interpretation problem that is in need of reform. Judges routinely face complex interpretive choices when they
resolve disputes over potentially copyrightable works. Judges choose
whether to resolve an issue as a matter of law, whether to admit — or
even require — extrinsic evidence that may be relevant to their interpretation, and whether to rely on judicial intuition or formal analysis
in their decision-making. The interpretive choices that judges make
about works have played an important but unacknowledged role in
outcomes of cases involving screenplays, architecture, novels, pop
songs, nonfiction works, and photography.
The problem can be simplified to two choices: Judges must determine what they should use as the sources of their interpretation,
and how they should interpret the works being litigated. These competing interpretive methods require judges to choose among different
sources: the work itself, and the context around the work, including its
reception, the author’s intentions, or expert opinions. Further, judges
must decide whether to produce formalist analysis applying copyright
doctrines or to offer conclusions with little more than judicial intuition
to show their reasoning.
Even though judges in copyright cases face potentially outcomerelevant choices among competing sources of interpretation, their selection of interpretive methods has been almost entirely overlooked by
scholars and judges alike. Indeed, the very existence of interpretive
choices as a crucial methodological question in copyright cases has
not yet been widely acknowledged. This Article addresses that gap in
scholarship by demonstrating that interpretive choices are ubiquitous
and necessary in copyright litigation and by illuminating the competing methods and sources that judges select from when they make their
interpretive decisions.
Copyright’s interpretive choice regime controls questions of major importance for the parties, such as whether an issue is a matter of
law or fact, whether an issue may be decided at summary judgment,
whether expert testimony is allowed, and whether a use is fair. The
resulting lack of transparency characterizing copyright’s interpretive
practices creates unpredictability and unfairness for the parties. As a
function of interpretive choice, works of art may escape destruction if
found non-infringing;1 movies may get made or languish as legal dis1. See Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 712 (2d Cir. 2013).
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putes get ironed out;2 novels may get banned or declared a fair use;3
fan works may be threatened.4 Ultimately, awareness of interpretive
choice helps us to evaluate the proper allocation and scope of decisional authority, to properly characterize issues, and to identify the
best tools to use in copyright’s interpretive work. The Article concludes with a call for greater methodological transparency, and it offers a few modest prescriptions about which interpretive methods
might be best adopted, by whom, when, and why. It proposes that
judges in copyright cases incline more toward analysis than intuition
and prioritize text over context, as default settings.
This Article describes two dimensions of largely unacknowledged
and unconstrained realms of interpretive complexity that judges face.
First, judges make decisions about sources of interpretive authority
somewhere on an axis, one end of which would vest interpretive authority entirely in the text5 and the other entirely in the context,6
around or beyond the text. This Article terms this spectrum of judicial
decision-making the Text/Context axis. Second, judges must decide
what interpretive mode to use in approaching the text, and here they
make decisions somewhere along an axis where one end represents
analysis or exegesis of the works and the other end represents judicial
intuition.7 This Article terms this second realm of copyright’s interpretive complexity the Analysis/Intuition axis. These two axes help
explain copyright’s interpretive choice regime. Along the Analysis/Intuition axis, judges must decide whether (1) to offer affirmative
analysis of the text of the works at issue, explaining their reasoning
but perhaps constraining their future decision-making and leaving
them vulnerable to greater reversal rates, or (2) to offer conclusions
about the works at issue, justified by what appears to be little more
2. See Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1936); Effie
Film, LLC v. Murphy, 932 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
3. See Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 83 (2d Cir. 2010); Suntrust Bank v. Houghton
Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001).
4. See Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 554 (S.D.N.Y.
2008).
5. By “text,” I mean any potentially copyrightable work at issue in copyright litigation,
whether or not it contains actual “text.” Consequently, when this Article refers to “texts,” it
includes works of literature, music, film, visual art, and so on. The word “text” is a term
drawn from semiotic and aesthetic theories of interpretation, where it has a meaning
independent of meanings in law. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?
THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 2–3, 303–10 (1980) (describing a
formalist notion of the text as stable and a “self-sufficient repository of meaning” but
advancing his own contrary theory of interpretive authority, namely, that the text cannot
generate meaning without a reader actualizing it, subject to linguistic, institutional, and
other constraints).
6. By “context,” I mean the context “external” to the work, such as statements of
authorial intention, evidence of reader response and expert opinions.
7. By “analysis,” I mean focused discussion of the works at issue as texts that can be
interpreted through exposition of “textual evidence,” such as scenes from a film, shapes in a
painting, literary language, characters, and musical structures.
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than judicial intuition. Along the Text/Context axis, when considering
potentially copyrightable works, whether judging them through analysis or through intuition, judges must decide (1) whether to focus on
the work itself (a text-based approach) or (2) to consider the context
around the work (a contextualist approach).
Both of these interpretive axes, Analysis/Intuition and
Text/Context, directly implicate important doctrinal and evidentiary
questions in copyright law. In other words, these complex interpretive
questions can change the outcome of individual cases. Indeed, they
raise a question that has been fundamental in law and literature as a
question of power: “Who or what ‘controls’ the meaning of a text —
the author, the reader, the words of the text, [or] conventions of reading?”8 A judge, as a reader, derives meaning through interpretive
choices; it is in relying on one or more of these grounds — author,
reader, text, or conventions — that the reader makes a claim to interpretive authoritativeness.9 Yet despite their import for legal outcomes,
these interpretive choices rarely receive explicit treatment as such.
The various combinations of choices along the pair of axes exist
among a range of possible modalities of interpretation, no one of them
necessarily more correct than another. Judges can apply text-based,
contextualist, or other interpretive lenses, and indeed they do.10 In
fact, judicial decisions along the Analysis/Intuition axis may strongly — yet at the moment, invisibly — influence the decision-making
process, including some of the determinative issues on the
Text/Context axis, ultimately implicating crucial doctrinal and evidentiary questions in copyright law.
These interpretive choices may also dictate whether questions
may be resolved by the judge as a matter of law or whether they require further consideration by a jury or a judge acting as the trier of
fact. Furthermore, interpretive choice may determine what level of
constraint a judge will impose on her own analysis to ensure its legitimacy: Is judicial fiat (or gestalt) sufficient, or must the judge “show
her work,” that is, “give reasons”?11 This Article will demonstrate that
8. Jane B. Baron, Law, Literature, and the Problems of Interdisciplinarity, 108 YALE L.J.
1059, 1071 (1999).
9. Interpretive authority is a term of art in the humanities, associated with producing a
disciplined or reliable reading of a text, and at times challenged or destabilized as a concept
because no such reliable reading is possible. See FISH, supra note 5, at 13, 14, 301. It is thus
different from the term “interpretive authority” as understood in law, where the term is more
commonly used in the context of the delegation of interpretive power from Congress to
agencies in administrative law. See Jeffrey Wertkin, Reintroducing Compromise to the
NonDelegation Doctrine, 90 GEO. L.J. 1055, 1076. In the humanities, the concept of
interpretive authority refers to the justifications for the interpreter’s interpretation; in law, it
refers to who possesses the right — as a matter of democratic design — to decide what a
statute or rule may mean.
10. See Alfred C. Yen, Copyright Opinions and Aesthetic Theory, 71 S. CAL. L. REV.
247, 251 (1998).
11. See Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 43 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995).
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judges make choices between an analytical mode and an intuitive one
in how they choose to interpret works, even though these choices rarely surface as such.
This Article recasts interpretive choices as integral to copyright
law: They make the law operate properly. Copyright adjudication requires judges to adopt interpretive methodologies, whether or not they
address them explicitly.12 Interpretive choices can offer some explanation for the great divergence in outcomes and reasoning seen in infringement analysis more generally. Recognizing its importance can
improve the cogency of copyright doctrine throughout litigation.
Relatedly, exploring the impact interpretive choice has on copyright litigation helps expose two pernicious assumptions that recur in
case law: first, that nontechnical copyrightable works, that is, involving art rather than works of technology such as software, are not complex; second, that analyzing such artistic works is not difficult.13 In
fact, the reigning view is that judges presiding in copyright litigation
over nontechnical works have it easy.14 In reality, judges, even in socalled nontechnical copyright cases, often operate under interpretive
conditions of considerable “empirical uncertainty.”15 It is no surprise
then, that judges may seem unclear about the import of their methodological selection when they interpret the works at issue. Just as patent
law requires “technological engagement” of judges,16 copyright law
requires a kind of interpretive engagement, in the form of selecting
interpretive methods along two axes of complexity.
It ought to be stated that acknowledging copyright’s complexity
does not mean that interpreting works for the purposes of copyright
litigation is hopeless or that the works themselves are semiotically
12. Both Farley and Yen discuss the range of possible aesthetic (or interpretive) theories,
from intentionalism to aesthetic pragmatism. See Yen, supra note 10; Christine Haight
Farley, Judging Art, 79 TUL. L. REV. 805, 845–46 (2006). But neither of them focuses on
how these theories reflect interpretive methodologies that, elsewhere, the law recognizes as
legally significant choices. I concur with Professor Yen that each “move to a new analytical
perspective is itself a decision of aesthetic significance.” Yen, supra note 10, at 250.
However, I am more interested in the fact that shifts in perspective point to
unacknowledged, legally relevant choices about interpretive method.
13. I adopt the term “nontechnical” based on its use in prior case law. See, e.g.,
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that expert
testimony will not generally be permitted or necessary if the subject matter is not “complex
or technical”); Price v. Fox Entm’t Group, 499 F. Supp. 2d 382, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(“These are not highly technical works. The jury is capable of recognizing and
understanding the similarities between the works without the help of an expert.”).
14. See, e.g., Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2010)
(“[T]he Court recognizes that the task of comparing two fiction works is not highly
technical, and indeed requires no specific training . . . .”), aff’d, Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co.,
438 F. App’x 587, 588 (9th Cir. 2011).
15. See Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 76 (2000)
(“[M]any debates over interpretive doctrine are of this character, and should be reframed as
problems of choosing optimal interpretive doctrine under conditions of severe empirical
uncertainty.”).
16. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 7 (2010).
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indeterminate. It is important to distinguish between the complexity of
the works and their hermeneutic indeterminacy. The former refers to
interpretive complexity in law, which could lead to different legal
outcomes; the latter refers to indeterminacy in semiotic or hermeneutic theory — that works are susceptible to many readings and can
mean different things for different readers — for non-legal purposes
such as art criticism, literary analysis, reading, rewriting, and even
other functional uses of copyrightable works. And neither of these is
the same as legal indeterminacy, which is the idea that some answers
to legal questions are unknowable.17 So long as the interpretation of
the work is not serving litigation or other legal purposes, the indeterminacy of the work’s meaning need not concern us. However, in copyright litigation, the works at issue must be interpreted for legal
purposes, and here it is indisputable not only that a fixed meaning
may attach but that frequently for an outcome to be reached, it must
attach so that copyright doctrines can be applied. This is nothing new,
from the vantage point of law and humanities, which concerned itself
with this debate over meaning at its outset.18 It has likewise been discussed in patent law to considerable extent already, in the context of
the determinacy of patent claims.19
Here, this Article makes no claims about the indeterminacy of
textual meaning, or what we might term the “semiotic indeterminacy
thesis” which interested early law-and-literature scholars.20 Instead,
this Article aspires to show that something else important and little
remarked upon is taking place. Judges make difficult interpretive
choices that can be helpfully viewed as taking place along two pre17. Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339, 341
(1996) (“[A] proposition of law . . . is indeterminate if the materials of legal analysis — the
accepted sources of law and the accepted methods of working with those sources such as
deduction and analogy — are insufficient to resolve the question, ‘Is this proposition or its
denial a correct statement of the law?’”).
18. A distillation of that debate might be many meanings: literature; a single meaning:
law. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and
Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551 (1982); Michael Pantazakos, The Form of Ambiguity: Law,
Literature, and the Meaning of Meaning, 10 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 199, 217
(1998) (“[L]aw is not nor should it be taught as only what we say it is. Law is not mere
formulas but forms. However . . . [this] does not mean nor should it be taught to mean that
these alternatives necessarily define law as a formless relativism.”).
19. An excellent variation on this discussion of interpretive determinacy has clarified its
import for debates over meaning in patent claim construction. Professors T.J. Chiang and
Lawrence Solum have argued that the indeterminacy inherent in claim construction (the
claim’s linguistic elements) does not typically drive patent litigation, which is instead
determined by policy choices judges make about what role claim construction should play.
Their identification of what they term the “linguistic indeterminacy thesis” helps them
accurately diagnose what ails patent law. Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, The
Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law, 123 YALE L.J. 530, 534 (2013). That
fine distinction holds here too, if the potential indeterminacy of texts, that is, their
susceptibility to multiple meanings, is isolated and identified as “semiotic indeterminacy.”
20. See generally Guyora Binder, “What’s Left: Beyond Critique: Law, Culture, and the
Politics of Form,” 69 TEX. L. REV. 1985 (1991).
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dictable axes of complexity. The actual range of interpretive methods
used by judges contains many variations, but for conceptual clarity
distilling those choices into two pairings — Analytical/Intuitive and
Text/Context — helps illuminate the impact the interpretive method
has on the outcome of a case.
Accordingly, this Article seeks to make several contributions.
First, it offers a descriptive theory of copyright’s interpretive practices
by showing multiple points at which judges do, and indeed must,
make complex but often unacknowledged interpretive decisions,
along two different but interrelated axes.21 Second, it shows that judges make legally meaningful, but inconsistent, decisions about interpretive methods in copyright cases. The Article calls for greater
methodological transparency, and it offers a few modest prescriptions
about which interpretive methods might be best adopted, by whom,
when, and why. It proposes that judges in copyright cases should be
more inclined toward analysis than intuition and prioritize text over
context, as default settings. Copyright law could benefit from a rulestructured analytic system, a set of interpretive defaults that
(1) prioritize analysis over intuition and (2) focus first on the work but
then allow a reasonable “escape route,” or methodological second tier,
to soften the possible harshness of the rule-based approach. A turn to
analysis and an emphasis on text could constrain judicial discretion
and steer judges toward more transparent reasoning. In turn, these
interpretive defaults could help produce greater consistency and fairness. Part II shows how interpretive choices are built into copyright
law along two interrelated axes of complexity and provides examples
of cases in which judges make inconsistent choices along these interpretive axes in ways that can affect outcomes. It shows that there is
little coherence or consistency in judicial method selection and that
there is confusion about what might even count as a method. Part III
argues against the reigning view that so-called nontechnical copyright
cases are somehow interpretively simpler than technical ones, such as
software cases. Part IV proposes a turn toward analysis and away
from intuitionism, along with greater judicial emphasis on texts over
context. Part V concludes.

II. JUDGES MAKE NECESSARY AND DIVERGENT INTERPRETIVE
CHOICES IN COPYRIGHT LAW
Copyright adjudication requires that judges select among interpretive choices in order to resolve the basic issues at the heart of any dispute, but copyright scholarship has only begun to acknowledge the
21. Even avoiding interpretation and aesthetic theories reflects an implicit
methodological decision, a tendency toward “intuitionism” and conclusory analysis. See
infra Part II.D.2.
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extent to which judges may be making or avoiding interpretive decisions. Professor Tushnet’s pioneering scholarship on judicial interpretation of images has shown that judges do make what amount to
methodological choices about visual works they confront in copyright
cases.22 Professor Yen’s work laid crucial groundwork by positing
that aesthetic theories parallel judicial reasoning in copyright law,
thus showing that judges necessarily make interpretive choices.23 Professor Farley’s scholarship similarly revealed the substantial role
played by judicial intuition in the adjudication of works of art underscoring the ubiquity of judicial choice.24 Other works contributed to a
scholarly conversation largely focused on aesthetic issues and objectivity in copyright adjudication.25 The interpretive problem addressed
herein is broader than that. It is methodological, not purely aesthetic
or evaluative. Further, it is confined neither to one particular methodological approach,26 nor to one class of works, such as visual or
musical works, where earlier scholars have focused.27 Most crucially,
interpretive choices play a direct role in litigation, or at least they can.
All potentially copyrightable works force judges to grapple with interpretive questions that copyright scholarship has overlooked as a
legally relevant methodological issue.28 The extant literature on interpretive choice in copyright law is thus promising but incomplete.
A range of possible interpretive methods exists, but for the purposes of conceptual clarity, this Article distills the interpretive options
22. Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 683 (2012).
23. Yen, supra note 10, at 250. I note that Yen’s footnotes draw mostly on primary
sources (cases) and on secondary sources external to law (such as art theory). I take that as
evidence that the state of scholarship on copyright’s interpretive practices was
underdeveloped before Yen’s seminal, interdisciplinary article.
24. Farley, supra note 12, at 845–46.
25. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, Contradiction and Context in American Copyright Law, 9
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 303, 305–07 (1991); Amy B. Cohen, Copyright Law and the
Myth of Objectivity: The Idea-Expression Dichotomy and the Inevitability of Artistic Value
Judgments, 66 IND. L.J. 175, 184–95 (1990); Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright
Decisionmaking: The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719
(1987).
26. See, e.g., Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader
Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445 (2008); H. Brian Holland, Social Semiotics in the
Fair Use Analysis, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 335 (2011); Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad
Reviewers: Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 20 (2013); Elizabeth
Winkowski, A Context-Sensitive Inquiry: The Interpretation of Meaning in Cases of Visual
Appropriation Art, 12 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 746 (2013).
27. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 22; Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, The Freedom To Copy:
Copyright, Creation and Context, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 477 (2007); Olufunmilayo B.
Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and Cultural Context,
84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006); Melissa M. Mathis, Note, Function, Nonfunction, and
Monumental Works of Architecture: An Interpretive Lens in Copyright Law, 22 CARDOZO
L. REV. 595 (2001); Jessica Silbey, Images in/of Film, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 171 (2012–
13).
28. Zahr Kassim Said, Only Part of the Picture: A Response to Professor Tushnet’s
Worth a Thousand Words, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 349 (2013).
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by relying on the interrelated complexities of the Analysis/Intuition
axis and the Text/Context axis. Copyright requires that judges make
interpretive choices about how they will interpret the works at issue
and what they will focus on in the course of their interpretive work.
In order to understand the effect and operation of copyright’s interpretive choice regime, it is first necessary to situate these interpretive choices in copyright law. Part II.A sketches the trajectory of a
standard copyright infringement case and shows that, at multiple
points in copyright’s analytic trajectory, the adjudication of expressive
works requires that judges make decisions about the method of interpretation they will use. Part II.B shows that many interpretive modalities exist for judges to select. Part II.C fleshes out the operation of
interpretive choice in the copyright context and provides examples of
cases that illuminate the complexity of the Analysis/Intuition axis,
when courts choose analysis, intuition, or a point somewhere between
the two. Part II.D focuses on the interpretive complexity of the
Text/Context axis that requires judges to focus their attention on a
source of interpretive authority at different points in the litigation.
A. Copyright Cases Follow an Analytical Trajectory
Interpretive choice is a feature, not a bug, in copyright law. To assert a valid claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show
“(1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying . . . of protectable
elements of the work.”29 The first step is typically straightforward.
Once copyright ownership of a registered copyright has been proven,
the analysis in a copyright infringement claim involves two distinct
inquiries: whether a work was copied and whether any such copying
was improper.30 The first inquiry can be answered with the defendant’s admission or other direct evidence of copying,31 but in practice,
these are rarely available.32 More typically, copying is proven through
a two-pronged inferential analysis: (1) proof of defendant’s access to
the copied work and (2) substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s
work and the defendant’s work.33 The term substantial similarity is
confusing because it arises at two different stages: first, when plaintiffs must prove copying; second, when they must prove that the copying was improper. The general rule is that expert evidence may be
admissible on the question of substantial similarity on the copying
29. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir. 1999).
30. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); see Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
31. See Boisson v. Banian, 273 F.3d 262, 267 (2d Cir. 2001).
32. Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Records, 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003).
33. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d Cir.
1976); Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
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inquiry,34 when it is sometimes helpfully referred to as probative similarity.35 This inquiry is a question of law, deemed to be well-suited for
disposition by a judge.36
The inquiry on substantial similarity with respect to improper
copying determines whether the copying was the sort that is legally
actionable.37 The court must determine, theoretically as a question of
fact, whether the similarities between the works pertain to copyrightable material and not simply to unprotectable ideas.38 At this stage, the
court again considers the substantial similarity of plaintiff’s and defendant’s works, only this time the standard is typically that of the lay
observer, not the expert.39 In fact, expert testimony is generally inadmissible on this point.40 At this phase, substantial similarity is something the ordinary observer can and must discern without the aid of an
expert witness.41 It is considered a subjective inquiry that goes to the
jury unless a judge finds that no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity.42 In practice, judges often make the determination of
substantial similarity on early motions and also in lieu of a jury. This
brief outline constitutes the analytic trajectory for a judge to follow in
a copyright infringement case.43
Within this trajectory, doctrinal questions, such as the
idea/expression dichotomy, merger, conceptual separability, and
scènes à faire also make interpretive demands on judges. Each of the
core requirements for copyrightability, a threshold inquiry in copyright law, implicates some aesthetic or interpretive theory. Copyright
34. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
35. Alan Latman, “Probative Similarity” as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1187 (1990).
36. See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
37. 4-13 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01
(2014).
38. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc. 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
39. Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 473.
40. An exception exists where works, such as software, are thought to be sufficiently
complex that a jury or factfinder would be unable to make a determination without expert
assistance. Mark A. Lemley, Our Bizarre System for Proving Copyright Infringement, 57 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 719, 733 (2010).
41. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1266 (11th Cir. 2001); Castle
Rock Entertm’t, Inc. v. Carol Pub. Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1998); Shaw v.
Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1356–57 (9th Cir. 1990).
42. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 844–45 (9th Cir. 2004).
43. My account here is intended as a descriptive, uncontroversial account of the way
copyright cases are structured, and it draws on the dominant accounts of copyright law
found in the most oft-cited opinions and treatises. However, other scholars have lamented
many aspects of the structure of copyright infringement analysis, and their critiques
populate the footnotes of this Article. Notably, one scholar has called one aspect of
substantial similarity analysis — the admissibility of expert evidence — “exactly
backwards.” Lemley, supra note 40, at 736. Another writes that “[o]ur current treatment of
infringement, which asks whether there is ‘substantial similarity’ between two works, makes
impossible and self-contradictory demands on factfinders . . . .” Tushnet, supra note 22, at
687–88.
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protection extends only to “original works of authorship fixed in any
tangible medium of expression.”44 The qualifying requirements of
copyright can thus be enumerated as follows: originality, status as a
work, authorship as the Act defines the term, and fixation in a tangible
medium.45 How does one find originality? What counts as a work?
What are the boundaries of authorship? What does fixation look like
in the digital world? Or in the natural world? Each of these issues creates an interpretive pressure point, at which judges must select an interpretive method.
Copyrightability provides fertile terrain for exploring interpretive
pressure points because it is both a threshold inquiry for copyright law
and up to the judge to decide. Because copyrightability is a question
of law, it empowers judges to determine the question with considerable discretion and without the need for fact-finding.46 Efforts by parties to include expert testimony on this question have often been
unsuccessful, and judges continue to assert their own authority, independent of expert guidance.47
Yet folded into the determination of originality are necessarily interpretive decisions about which not all judges are explicit. Some
seem to ignore these choices altogether; others recognize these choices but seek to avoid the appearance of making a choice not properly
for the determination of a judge.48 Determining a work’s copyrightability may require all of the following: determination of its originality;49 inquiry into whether its form and context meet copyright law’s
fixation requirement;50 determination of whether its form and context
are useful,51 and thus excluded from copyright protection; and ideaexpression analysis, including a filtering of elements that should remain in the public domain (such as ideas, historical facts, or scènes à
faire) from those that can be protected under copyright.52 To resolve
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
45. 4-13 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37.
46. 3-12 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 37, § 12.10.
47. Delightful examples of turf-protecting dicta populate cases, such as: “If the court
determines that mannequin heads are copyrightable subject matter, the jury will be so
instructed . . . . There is no need for expert testimony on this subject; in a trial there is only
one legal expert — the judge.” Pivot Point Int’l v. Charlene Prods., 932 F. Supp. 220, 225
(N.D. Ill. 1996); see also infra Part II.D.
48. See Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304 (7th Cir. 1983) (“Artistic originality
indeed might inhere in a detail, a nuance, a shading too small to be apprehended by a
judge.”); infra Part II.D (observing that courts fear to make aesthetic judgments).
49. Section 102(a) extends copyright protection only to “original works of authorship.” 2
PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:26.
50. Goldstein v. Cal., 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973).
51. 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:145.
52. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 544 (1985)
(“[S]imilarities between the original and the challenged work traceable to the copying or
paraphrasing of uncopyrightable material, such as historical facts, memoranda and other
public documents, and quoted remarks of third parties, must be disregarded in evaluating
whether the second author’s use was fair or infringing.”).
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these inherent copyright issues, judges make legally meaningful interpretive choices, with little meaningful guidance about how to do so
and many competing options at their disposal.53
B. Many Interpretive Modalities Exist
Interpretive issues are tightly interwoven with most of the substantive questions that make up a copyright infringement case. Most
issues that arise can be considered subsets of these three main groupings: copyrightability, improper copying, and defenses. Interpretive
pressure points, like the ones raised by these doctrines, are present and
inevitable in copyright law. And at each of these pressure points,
judges may select from among a number of possible interpretive
methods.
When judges decide how to interpret, they are making choices
along the Analysis/Intuition axis, and when they decide on what to
focus, they must make choices along the Text/Context axis.54 The
range of interpretive methods corresponds roughly to different aesthetic theories of art. The seminal article on this topic is by Professor
Yen, who categorizes the major schools of interpretive theory as formalism, intentionalism, and institutionalism, and tracks their deployment in copyright cases.55 Yen’s article draws on art history, and his
categories make sense in that context. It could be argued, mistakenly,
that the impact of Yen’s scholarship is limited to cases in which the
works at issue are artistic ones, such as plays, paintings, or novels. On
the contrary, these aesthetic and interpretive issues arise in all copyright litigation. Hence, for the purposes of this Article, the emphasis
lies less on the aesthetic nature of the works and their interpretive
puzzles, and instead more on the interpretive complexity that copyright litigation itself produces. This complexity requires that judges
decide how to interpret works at issue and on what to base their interpretive authority.

53. See Pamela Samuelson, A Fresh Look at Tests for Nonliteral Copyright Infringement,
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1821, 1823 (stating that it is “problematic . . . that there are too many
different tests [for copyright infringement] and not enough guidance about which one to use
in what kinds of cases” and calling for courts to “give more guidance about what constitutes
protectable expression in copyrighted works and what aspects, besides abstract ideas, are
unprotectable by copyright”).
54. This paradigm is neither purely literary, which would require more categories, nor
purely legal, which would require engagement with existing, but heavily overdetermined
terms, like textualism, originalism, and purposivism. Instead, it draws on literary and
aesthetic theories but addresses the realities of copyright litigation. For example, this
interdisciplinary classification reflects awareness of the role admissibility of evidence plays,
as well as the legal significance of allocating decision-making power, and it focuses on the
practical importance of interpretive theories for copyright’s substance and procedure.
55. Yen, supra note 10.
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C. Courts Disagree over What Methods and Sources To Use
Courts often disagree about the proper interpretive choices, as a
recent example makes plain. In Cariou v. Prince, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held twenty-five of thirty paintings by the defendant, an appropriation artist, to be making fair use of the photographer
Patrick Cariou’s work.56 It reversed and remanded as to the remaining
paintings, on which Judge Deborah Batts of the Southern District of
New York had previously granted plaintiff injunctive relief.57 The
parties settled as to the last five paintings.58 In my reading of the case,
the grounds for the Second Circuit’s reversal lie in a rejection of
Judge Batts’s interpretive choices.
Patrick Cariou is a photographer who produced a book of portraits of Jamaican Rastafarians and photographs of the Jamaican landscape for a book called Yes, Rasta.59 Richard Prince is a well-known
appropriation artist who purchased a copy of Yes, Rasta and then removed and reused the photos as the basis for an exhibition of his own,
entitled “Canal Zone.”60 Cariou sued Prince, as well as Larry Gagosian, the gallery owner who was to exhibit “Canal Zone” in Manhattan.61 Prince readily admitted to unauthorized use of Cariou’s
photographs, which could normally constitute copyright infringement.62 In Prince’s case, however, his lawyers argued that he had
transformed the works and therefore could claim fair use.63 Judge
Batts rejected defendants’ theory, finding it difficult to square a claim
of semiotic transformativeness with Prince’s deposition, in which he
admitted that he had not intended any particular message to comment
on Cariou’s artwork.64 Grounding her interpretive authority in
Prince’s authorial intentions,65 she granted Cariou injunctive relief,
which would have permitted Cariou to seize and destroy the several
dozen paintings in the “Canal Zone” exhibit.66
56. 714 F.3d 694, 698 (2d Cir. 2013).
57. Id. at 698–99.
58. Randy Kennedy, Richard Prince Settles Copyright Suit with Patrick Cariou over
Photographs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2014, 6:23 PM), available at
http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/18/richard-prince-settles-copyright-suit-withpatrick-cariou-over-photographs/.
59. Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 343 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 342.
62. See id. at 344.
63. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants’ Joint Motion for Summary
Judgment at 14–16, Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 108-CV11327).
64. See Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
65. See id. (“Prince did not intend to comment on Cariou, on Cariou’s Photos, or on
aspects of popular culture closely associated with Cariou or the Photos when he
appropriated the Photos, and Prince’s own testimony-shows [sic] that his intent was not
transformative within the meaning of Section 107 . . . .”).
66. Id. at 355.
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Judge Batts’s reasoning was facially appropriate, if the remedy
she selected seems somewhat draconian. Batts followed Rogers v.
Koons, a case which had stressed the need for a fair user to comment
on the work,67 and defined transformativeness narrowly: “Prince’s
Paintings are transformative only to the extent that they comment on
[Cariou’s] Photos.”68 She found the works could not possibly be transformative because Prince had, by his own admission, no intention of
commenting on the underlying works.69 Instead, he had testified that
he wished to use the photos as facts, for their truth value.70
The Second Circuit reversed and remanded in terms that delivered
something of a rebuke.71 The Second Circuit held that all but five of
the paintings were fair use, and the remaining ones were to be considered anew by the district court.72 The key holding of the decision on
appeal was that Judge Batts had applied an incorrect legal standard for
determining transformativeness by rigidly applying the Rogers standard73 and by emphasizing the author’s intent rather than the reasonable observer’s perception of the work.74 In the terms of this Article’s
argument, Batts prioritized authorial intention over other sources of
interpretive authority, such as text, audience reception, or expert testimony. Choosing authorial intention reflected a particular methodology that Batts selected without discussion and that arguably provided
the grounds for Cariou’s reversal, when the Second Circuit disavowed
Batts’s legal analysis.75
The choices over interpretive methods in the Cariou litigation are
neither unique nor simple. Judges must — and routinely do — make
methodological choices regarding whether to produce analysis or offer intuition and where to locate their interpretive authority. Depend67. 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir.1992)
68. Cariou, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
69. See id.
70. Id. (“Prince also testified that his purpose in appropriating other people’s originals for
use in his artwork is that doing so helps him ‘get as much fact into [his] work and reduce[]
the amount of speculation.’”).
71. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 706 (“As even Cariou concedes, however, the district court’s
legal premise was not correct. The law imposes no requirement that a work comment on the
original or its author in order to be considered transformative.”).
72. Id. at 712.
73. See Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-Out of
Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence? A Plea for A Neo-Traditional Approach, 24
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 321, 341–42 (2014).
74. See Kathleen K. Olson, The Future of Fair Use, 19 COMM. L. & POL’Y 417, 428–29,
431 (“The Second Circuit in Cariou discounted the artistic intent of the secondary user and
substituted its own judgment as part of its ‘reasonable observer’ standard for judging
whether a different expressive purpose was present in the secondary work.”).
75. It is worth noting that Batts’s choice was not unreasonable in its methodology, even if
it was ultimately overruled. Authorial intention remained sufficiently viable that it animated
the dissent of the Second Circuit’s Judge Wallace. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 713 (“Unlike the
majority . . . I view Prince’s statements — which, as Prince acknowledges, consist of ‘his
view of the purpose and effect of each of the individual [p]aintings’ — as relevant to the
transformativeness analysis.”) (Wallace, J., dissenting).
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ing on where a judge focuses interpretive authority, a case could result
in a different outcome. The problem is that, at present, there is little
consensus that sophisticated interpretation is necessary, let alone
guidance on how interpretation can and should be done.76 Yet interpretive grounds compete for authority. Choosing one interpretive
method over another, as Judge Batts did in the Cariou litigation, does
not occur in a vacuum of critical and legal theory, or at least it should
not since those fields have already weighed the impact of making particular interpretive choices.77
D. The Analysis/Intuition Axis
Judges in most copyright cases offer some amount of analysis of
the works at issue. This may be as minimal as a brief summary or as
extended as a discussion of tropes, characters, settings, or sources.
Different circuits have developed habits of judicial analysis, and even
formal tests for substantial similarity, that would seem to dictate the
manner and necessity of conducting these so-called tests.78 All the
tests are designed to sift the protected from the unprotected and conclude whether or not the works are substantially similar. The tests
include (1) two-step copying and improper appropriation;79
(2) extrinsic dissection/intrinsic judgment;80 (3) abstractions test;81
(4) total concept and feel;82 and (5) abstraction, filtration, and comparison.83 All tests, except for the concept and feel test, require courts to
conduct analysis that creates a record of judicial discussion of textual
evidence.84

76. See infra Part III.B (arguing that interpreting works for the purpose of copyright law
is complex and requires sophisticated analysis).
77. See Farley, supra note 12, at 839 (“[L]aw can often operate in a vacuum. The difficult
questions . . . that courts encounter here have been addressed in philosophy, art history, and
art criticism. But courts never acknowledge that these questions have already been theorized
and that there are bodies of scholarship that are relevant and could be helpful.”).
78. It is beyond the scope of the Article to discuss each of the tests and their merits;
besides, Pamela Samuelson’s essay sets the tests out and describes their pros and cons,
Samuelson, supra note 53, at 1823–40, and Mark Lemley’s essay describes the tests in the
context of the general confusion across circuits, Lemley, supra note 40.
79. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
80. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122–23 (2d Cir. 1930).
82. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 1970).
The phrase “total concept and feel” originates with Roth but is sometimes found elsewhere
in the case law as the “overall look and feel” approach. Shyam Balganesh, Irina Manta &
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. REV. 267, 274 (2015).
83. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992).
84. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 725.
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1. The Analysis Approach
When judges produce such analysis, they typically train their focus on the works and their similarities and differences, and they may
discuss artistic choices that are evident in the works themselves.
For example, in Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., Judge Kaplan of
the Southern District of New York was called on to determine the
nature of copyright protection of photographs,85 which in turn required his assessment of the amount of originality in plaintiff’s photograph.86 In an action between a photographer, Jonathan Mannion, and
an advertising agency representing Coors Brewing Co., Kaplan held
that Mannion’s photograph was sufficiently original to warrant protection.87 Mannion had created a three-quarter-length portrait of Kevin
Garnett, a basketball star, in the foreground and a cloudy sky in the
background.88 Garnett wore a white t-shirt, white athletic pants, and
bright jewelry.89 Defendants’ photograph featured a similarly posed
young man, also muscular and African-American, wearing white
clothing in front of a cloudy backdrop.90 Kaplan’s opinion offers a
sophisticated and granular discussion of types of originality: originality in rendition (how a work is created),91 originality in timing,92 and
originality in creation of the subject.93 While Kaplan ultimately turned
to judicial intuition to analyze the photographs in question, his interpretive methodology started with the author’s intention as a function
of choices the works make manifest:
Decisions about film, camera, and lens, for example,
often bear on whether an image is original. But the
fact that a photographer made such choices does not
alone make the image original. “Sweat of the brow”
is not the touchstone of copyright. Protection derives
from the features of the work itself, not the effort
that goes into it.94

85. 377 F. Supp. 2d 444, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
86. See id. at 454–55.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 447.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 448.
91. Originality in rendition refers to how the work is created. See id. at 452 (“[C]opyright
protects not what is depicted, but rather how it is depicted.”).
92. Originality in timing refers to when a photographer is in the right place at the right
time. Id. at 452–53.
93. Originality in creation of the subject refers “to the extent that the photographer
created ‘the scene or subject to be photographed.’” Id. at 453.
94. Id. at 451 (footnote omitted).
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Merely working hard, no matter how intense the effort, does not
give rise to copyright in the final product.95 This is true in theory, at
least, if not always in application. Judges are often at pains to distinguish choices that reflect so-called “sweat of the brow,” which copyright does not protect per se, from choices that are in fact creative
decisions.96 Put another way, no matter how much an author intends a
work to be original or works hard to make it so, the proof lies in the
text, not in the intention or the effort.
Despite the appeal of focusing on the works themselves, courts do
not always engage in such analysis. This avoidance of analysis may
have to do with a peculiar feature of copyright law. Bleistein v. Donaldson,97 an early photography case, contained dicta that has come to
be known as the aesthetic non-discrimination principle: It stands for
the idea that judges in copyright cases will refrain from “judicial art
evaluation” to make determinations about what can be protected by
copyright.98 Yet this principle has been understood more broadly —
and perhaps improperly — to stand for the idea that aesthetics of any
kind do not belong in copyright law.99 Judges may reasonably fear
that discussion of certain issues connected with interpretive aesthetics
will run afoul of Bleistein.100 Accordingly, at times judges offer reasons or what appear to be intuition-fueled judgments precisely to
avoid the kind of interpretive puzzles that this Article argues are inevitable in copyright litigation.
2. Intuition in Copyright Law
Intuitionism refers to the judicial tendency to rely on intuition rather than analysis, hunch rather than data. The term in this Article
encompasses two related forms of intuitionist analysis: first, gestalt
intuitionism; second, intuitionism about the ordinary observer standard. The gestalt, or holistic approach,101 holds that the whole may be
greater than or different from the sum of the parts. Copyright’s total
95. See id. (citing Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F. Supp. 2d 191, 197
(S.D.N.Y. 1999)).
96. See id. (citing Feist Publ’ns Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359–60
(1991)).
97. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
98. Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?,
25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2 (2001).
99. Id. at 1.
100. The aesthetic non-discrimination principle refers to the entrenched principle that
judges in copyright cases should not evaluate works of art for their aesthetic merits in the
course of adjudication. Bleistein’s nondiscrimination principle has been called “[o]ne of the
more enduring observations in all of copyright.” Id.
101. The term gestalt, or gestaltism, comes from “[t]he theory in psychology that the
objects of mind come as complete forms or configurations which cannot be split into parts;
e.g., a square is perceived as such rather than as four discrete lines.” Gestalt Definition
368920, STEDMANS MEDICAL DICTIONARY available at Westlaw.
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concept and feel approach, for instance, has operated to create a copyrightable whole out of uncopyrightable parts.102 The second intuitionist area for copyright interpretation lies in judicial speculation about
the ordinary observer. In theory, the lay (or ordinary) observer functions much like the reasonable person in tort law.103 In tort law, this is
commonly a jury question informed by the commonplace experiences
of twelve different people. In copyright law, by contrast, this determination is often little more than a judicial pronouncement of what one
judge believes the ordinary person would take to be the work’s “aesthetic appeal.”104 This determination is little more than intuitionism.
In a fundamental sense, judicial intuition is always at work in legal analysis in the common law system. Usually though, intuition
does not substitute for formal methods. A judge would be hard
pressed to defend an intuitive reading of a statute against a textualist
reading.105 Judges do not simply say: “this is what the statute seems to
mean to me,” or “my gut tells me the Constitutional meaning of liberty is . . . .” Doing so would be replacing canons of construction and
other interpretive tools with hunches. Yet this sort of intuitionism operates with frequency in copyright law. It does so both by design and
by accident. It does so by design through legal standards that empower judges to speak in the guise of the ordinary observer, and to make
legal rulings based on the “total concept and feel” of the works at issue. For example, in one case concerning the copyrightability of the
jungle character Tarzan, the court issued a pronouncement of his copyrightability with nothing more than intuition to support it.106 The
court offered its own impressions of Tarzan’s copyrightability: “Tarzan is the ape-man. He is an individual closely in tune with his jungle
environment, able to communicate with animals yet able to experience human emotion. He is athletic, innocent, youthful, gentle and
strong. He is Tarzan.”107
Thus, intuitionism in copyright cases casts a long shadow –
through general judicial intuition and through the lay observer standard employed in copyright law. Under the “lay observer standard,” the
trier of fact must determine whether the works in question would be
102. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
103. See Irina Manta, Reasonable Copyright, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1303 (2012).
104. See Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960) (“[T]he patterns in which these figures are distributed to make up the design as a
whole are not identical. However, the ordinary observer, unless he set out to detect the
disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and regard their aesthetic appeal as the
same.”) (emphasis added); Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc., 262 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir.
2001).
105. The same would hold for a plain-meaning, structuralist, purposivist, originalist, or
pluralist reading.
106. See Zahr K. Said, Fixing Copyright in Characters: Literary Perspectives on a Legal
Problem, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 769, 815 (2013).
107. Burroughs v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 388, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
aff’d, 683 F.2d 610 (2d Cir. 1982).
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found substantially similar by a “hypothetical” ordinary observer
whose reasonably expected impressions are supposed to guide the
judge.108 The lay observer standard receives fuller discussion below.
Another area of intuitionist adjudication in copyright law is the
“total concept and feel” test first announced in Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co.109 In Roth, the Ninth Circuit found the plaintiff’s
cards to be copyrightable, which consisted of “common and ordinary
English words and phrases which are not original with Roth and were
in the public domain prior to the first use by plaintiff.”110 In so finding, it reversed the lower court’s decision and held that the combination of uncopyrightable factors nonetheless created something
copyrightable:
It appears to us that in total concept and feel the
cards of United are the same as the copyrighted cards
of Roth . . . . [T]he characters depicted in the art
work, the mood they portrayed, the combination of
art work conveying a particular mood with a particular message, and the arrangement of the words on the
greeting card are substantially the same as in Roth’s
cards.111
Roth’s analysis consists of examining the elements themselves to
try to capture what their “total feel” conveys. It is an approach that
downplays granular analysis and dissection into component parts, in
favor of a holistic (or gestalt) approach.
Since Roth, the total concept and feel test has become the most
prominent approach to comparing works of fiction.112 However, the
test raises numerous questions and, arguably, was not intended to become a generalizable test beyond the facts of the specific case.113
Which elements should be included in the enumeration of things to
consider as part of the “feel”? Should unprotectable aspects, such as
ideas, stock characters, or fonts, be filtered out before the impressionistic assessment begins? How can such an approach — which Tushnet
108. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Of
course, the ordinary observer does not actually decide the issue; the trier of fact determines
the issue in light of the impressions reasonably expected to be made upon the hypothetical
ordinary observer.”).
109. Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
110. Id. at 1109.
111. Id. at 1110.
112. Mitchell J. Rotbert, Total Concept and Feel: A Doctrine Running Amok, 45 MD. B.J.
20, 24 (2012).
113. Samuelson, supra note 53, at 1833 (“While the Roth majority certainly used the total
concept phrase, it did not announce this as a test that should be widely used in infringement
cases. The phrase was more an off-hand comment than a well-conceived way to think about
nonliteral infringement.”).
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refers to wryly as “a sort of magic by which unprotectable parts together become protected”114 — overcome the fact that unprotectable
aspects do not, by themselves merit protection? Is the total concept
and feel equivalent to what Feist called the creative selection and arrangement of facts?115 How does this impressionistic assessment
avoid being “highly subjective,”116 or an outright “abdication of analysis,” given that the standard seems to target a “wholly amorphous
referent”?117 In Tufkenian Import, a case about competing Oriental
rug designers, the court emphasized that the Roth test should be applied only after a court’s dissection into original and unprotectable
parts.118 Tufkenian Import’s approach to Roth suggests that the “total
concept and feel test” is but one of many possible interpretive approaches.119
Unfortunately, though, many courts apply it less carefully, tending to treat it less as an approach and more as an internal element.120
Judicial opinions may divide their analysis into discussion of similarities between the works, and subheadings will indicate that the analysis
treats plot, characters, settings, and total concept and feel all as equally situated and inevitable aspects of the works themselves.121 In other
words, one interpretive method, which is merely a possible perspective on the work, gets internalized as an element of the work. This
naturalizes the approach and makes it difficult for subsequent courts
to adopt alternative approaches. Further, it makes the interpretive logic effectively unassailable. As Tushnet has shown, under this test “the
factfinder is directed to the gestalt, but a gestalt can’t be broken
down.”122 Nonetheless, the gestalt approach often trumps other interpretive methods and sources, as it arguably did in Roth, when plaintiffs’ claims would have otherwise failed to clear the copyrightability
hurdle.

114. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 718.
115. See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991).
116. See Rotbert, supra note 112, at 25.
117. See Tufkenian Imp./Exp. Ventures, Inc. v. Einstein Moomjy, Inc., 338 F.3d 127, 134
(2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
118. Id.
119. See id. at 134 (stating the court’s approach to the test “is not so incautious” as to
abdicate analysis).
120. See Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 588 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating the court must
“examine the similarities in such aspects as the total concept and feel, theme, characters,
plot, sequence, pace, and setting of the [works]”).
121. See, e.g., Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak, 773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 429 (S.D.N.Y.
2011) (listing total concept and feel among the elements courts examine in “assessing
whether two works are similar”); Crane v. Poetic Prods. Ltd., 593 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596
(S.D.N.Y. 2009), aff’d, 351 F. App’x 516 (2d Cir. 2009).
122. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 719 (footnote omitted).
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3. The Limits of Intuition
Some courts have recognized the limitations of the total concept
and feel test. Shaw v. Lindheim is a classic copyright case that took
aim at intuitionism; its holding arguably hinges on a shift in interpretive method.123 Lou Shaw was a successful television scriptwriter who
argued that his program, The Equalizer, had been unlawfully copied
by defendants’ pilot script for their television series Equalizer.124 Defendants conceded access to the work because Richard Lindheim, an
executive at NBC, had reviewed Shaw’s script before NBC declined
to purchase it.125 Thereafter, Lindheim left NBC and created his own
series, conceding that he copied his title from Shaw’s script.126 Thus,
the case hinged on whether the two works were substantially similar
to support a finding of improper appropriation.127 The district court
had held as a matter of law that the works in question were not substantially similar.128 Shaw appealed, arguing that a reasonable trier of
fact could have found substantial similarity, and thus summary judgment was improper.129 Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed,
and the court reversed and remanded on this issue.130
In Shaw, it appears that the Ninth Circuit favored a combination
of formalist and reader-response approaches to interpret the works,
whereas the lower court prioritized a gestalt approach to interpretation. The court trained its attention on its own prior, much-criticized
substantial similarity analysis.131 Krofft had set out a bifurcated analysis: Step 1 was confined to what it called the “extrinsic” analysis, or
“dissection” of the works, that is, in this Article’s paradigm, formalist
analysis.132 At this stage, a court, perhaps relying on expert guidance,
could examine elements, such as subject matter and the setting for the
subject, so as to determine similarity of ideas as a matter of law.133
Step 2 consisted of an “intrinsic,” more intuitionist analysis by the
trier of fact, based on the ordinary reasonable person’s perception of
the works.134 This second phase focused on the expression of the
work’s ideas, where analytic dissection and expert testimony are not
appropriate.135
123. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir. 1990).
124. Id. at 1355.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. at 1363–64.
131. Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977).
132. Id. at 1164.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Shaw seized upon the ways in which Krofft’s distinction between
extrinsic and intrinsic analysis was flawed, especially Krofft’s rule
that the two phases should correspond to similarity of ideas and expression, respectively.136 Instead of framing Steps 1 and 2 as, respectively, (1) extrinsic/ideas and (2) intrinsic/expression, Shaw framed
the bifurcation as (1) objective and (2) subjective, both geared toward
analysis of expression.137
Shaw sought to correct Krofft’s mistaken bifurcation, and to minimize the impact of the subjective, manipulable part of infringement
analysis.138 Indeed, Shaw expressly criticized judicial discretion to
substitute intuitionism in place of actual assessment by a jury or trier
of fact: “a judicial determination under the intrinsic test is now virtually devoid of analysis, for the intrinsic test has become a mere subjective judgment as to whether two literary works are or are not simisimilar.”139
This subjective judgment was improper because “at the summary
judgment stage, the judge’s function is not [herself] to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether
there is a genuine issue for trial.”140 Shaw thus rejected a gestalt, or
intuitive approach, specifically lamenting its lack of meaningful analysis.141 For support of its own critique, Shaw cited to cases whose
analyses were more conclusory pronouncements than thoughtful deliberations, allowing them to “reach[] a result under the intrinsic test
in one paragraph.”142 Further, Shaw referred to an “absence of legal
analysis” as “frustrat[ing] appellate review of the intrinsic test.”143
In Shaw, a change in interpretive method could be said to constitute the main holding on appeal, even though Shaw did not cast its
decision explicitly in those terms.144 This discussion of Shaw illustrates different interpretive tests courts can employ: the use of intuitionism (by the lower court) and its critique and rejection in favor of a
more text-based formalism (in the appellate court). These methods
can affect the outcome of the case. Notwithstanding that defendants
won again on remand when new facts came to light, Shaw could have
come out differently on the original facts had the court applied a more
analytical method.

136. See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1357 (9th Cir. 1990).
137. Id.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1359 (alteration in original) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 249 (1986)).
141. See id. at 1357.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1363–64.
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E. The Text/Context Axis
This Section discusses the way different sources can serve as interpretive grounds, requiring that judges make complex decisions
about how to decide what counts as interpretable evidence. When they
locate the grounds for their interpretive authority, judges variously
prioritize: the text;145 the author’s intentions about it;146 the expert’s
testimony about it;147 the lay observer’s or audience’s reception of the
text;148 or the judge’s own intuitions or impressions of the work.149 In
most copyright cases, judges emphasize the texts at issue and center
their analysis there, sometimes even to the exclusion of contextual
evidence. Though many factors external to the text might be relevant
to interpretation under another approach, a formalist approach views
the internal features as carrying dispositive weight. This approach
parallels the “four-corners” approach to contracts in legal analysis.150
In the context of patent law, Craig Nard has called such an approach
“hypertextual.”151 Many classic copyright cases display some version
of formalist analysis, and some are, to paraphrase Nard, hypertextual
or exclusionary toward contextual evidence.152
1. Focus on the Text
In Walker v. Time Life Films, the author of the autobiographical
police memoir Fort Apache sued the authors and producers of a
screenplay entitled Fort Apache: The Bronx.153 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s motion, holding that no reasonable observer could have found
the two works in question to be substantially similar beyond unprotectable elements such as ideas.154 The court also held that it had not
been error for the lower court to base its judgment on the judge’s own
assessment of the works after having read the book and watched the
145. See, e.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57 (2d
Cir. 2010); Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d,
784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
146. See, e.g., Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992); Cariou v. Prince, 784 F.
Supp. 2d 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
147. See, e.g., Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004); Newton v. Diamond, 349
F.3d 591 (9th Cir. 2003); Dawson v. Hinshaw, 905 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1990); Tisi v. Patrick,
97 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
148. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
149. See Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
150. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER ET AL., BASIC CONTRACT LAW: CONCISE EDITION 525–26
(9th ed. 2013); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE
L.J. 926, 957–63 (2010).
151. Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4
(2000).
152. See id.
153. 784 F.2d 44, 46 (1986).
154. Id.
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movie, even though it meant refusing to view some of the evidence
plaintiff Walker had prepared and offered as proof of the works’ similarities.155
In the course of the lower court’s largely well-reasoned opinion,
Judge Edelstein considered a number of interpretive theories. He began and ended with the text, stating: “In determining copyright infringement, the works themselves supersede and control contrary
allegations and conclusions, or descriptions of the works as contained
in the pleadings.”156 He chose to locate his interpretive authority in
the text, prioritizing the court’s own close reading of the text itself
over “conclusions, or descriptions of the works,”157 such as critical
readings and expert testimony. By excluding plaintiff Walker’s own
analysis of the works’ similarities, Judge Edelstein also placed the text
over the author’s intentions and statements about it.158 To be sure, the
plaintiff is self-interested, and thus any statements offered up about
the works may be presumed to be informed by litigation strategy as
well as artistic intention. Nonetheless, Judge Edelstein’s emphasis on
the text reflected a choice: The text, in a formalist approach, transcends forces beyond or external to it in terms of its capacity to provide
interpretive authority.
The opinion’s analysis is thorough, attentively considering several elements, including genre.159 In its awareness of the importance of
genre,160 the court gestured to something like an audience interest,
which is external to the text. This is because works that operate within
the same genre will likely contain many similarities: think of two
cowboy westerns, two hardboiled detective stories, two movies about
dinosaur theme parks, and so on. The similarities common to a genre
require audience “decoding.”161 The presence of particular and usually
uncopyrightable elements162 is what allows audiences to recognize
certain genres as such.
Still, the opinion is unmistakably formalist, or text-based, in its
orientation. When Walker raised actual audience confusion as a plausible way of determining similarity, Judge Edelstein rejected his argument.163 Walker pointed to three newspaper articles which
155. Id. at 52.
156. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 784
F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1986).
157. Id.
158. See id. at 436–37.
159. Id. at 437–39.
160. See id. at 437.
161. STEPHEN NEALE, GENRE (1980).
162. Walker, 615 F. Supp. at 436 (“[I]ncidents, characters or settings which, as a practical
matter, are indispensable or standard in the treatment of a given topic — are not
protected.”). For instance, “[i]n any account based on experiences in a poverty stricken,
crime-ridden environment, depictions of bribery, prostitution, purse-snatching and
neighborhood hostility to law enforcers are inevitable.” Id.
163. See id. at 437.
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purported to confuse his and defendant’s works.164 These articles
failed to persuade the court that the lay observer in general would
have found the works substantially similar, because “a few opinions
cannot enlarge the scope of statutory protection enjoyed by a copyrighted property.”165 The text transcended the audience, at least on
this scant evidence.166
Walker’s formalist approach is also evident it its citation to Davis
v. United Artists, a case involving a film and a novel both based on
the Vietnam War.167 In Davis, the court granted defendants’ motion
for summary judgment, and it excluded plaintiff’s literary expert’s
opinion of the works’ similarity.168 The rationale for this exclusion
was strongly formalist: The court’s own reading and viewing of the
works gave it the clear ability to discern, on the basis of the works
themselves, that there was no similarity.169 The court cloaked its decision-making in the language of audience reception, yet the audience
was simply a construct imagined to share the same intuitions and
analysis as the court.170
Subsequent courts have relied heavily on Walker’s dicta, namely,
that “the works themselves supersede and control contrary descriptions of [the works].”171 Indeed, the Second Circuit’s reasoning in
Walker emphasized this text-centered approach, downplaying similarities that might have otherwise become apparent from expert analysis.172 In Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp.
(“Gaito II”), a case involving architectural plans, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, because substantial similarity can be determined at that early stage as a matter of law.173 If no substantial similarity exists between the works, plaintiff’s claim should be dismissed
for failure to state a claim.174 The standard for determining whether
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. The court does not rule here that actual audience confusion could never provide
interpretive authority for the finding that the works are substantially similar; it merely rules
that, in this case, there is too little evidence of audience confusion.
167. 547 F. Supp. 722, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
168. Id. at 724–28.
169. See id. at 725.
170. Id. (The court observed that if it “had read plaintiff’s book and seen defendants’
motion picture, unaware of this infringement action, it never would have dawned upon it, as
an average observer, that there was the slightest connection between the two works other
than in the common title and the subject of the Vietnam War”).
171. Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 52 (2d Cir. 1986).
172. See id. at 51 (“[C]omparison of secondary or descriptive materials cannot prove
substantial similarity under the copyright laws . . . because the works themselves, not
descriptions or impressions of them, are the real test for claims of infringement.”).
173. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito II), 602 F.3d 57, 59
(2d Cir. 2010), aff’g 2009 WL 5865686 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009).
174. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito I), No. 08 Civ.
6056(WCC), 2009 WL 5865686, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 2009).
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substantial similarity exists is “whether an average lay observer would
recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.”175 On the basis of this language, one might expect the
emphasis to be on the audience or the court’s understanding of the
works. It is audience perception of the similarity that appears to be the
standard for infringement. Instead, however, to determine whether
copyright infringement existed, the Gaito I court quoted the Walker
rule that works “supersede and control.”176
In Gaito II, the question was whether a copyright infringement
claim could be decided on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, which
was then an issue of first impression in the Second Circuit.177 The
case’s posture understandably steered the court’s discussion to the text
as a source of interpretive authority since the crucial question was
whether the texts and the parties’ pleadings, without more, could
serve as a sufficient basis for a final disposition. Still, the case is
noteworthy for doubling down on the autonomy of the text in resolving copyright disputes. Substantial similarity is typically considered
an “extremely close question of fact,”178 requiring resolution by the
trier of fact,179 and not usually recommended for resolution as a matter of law.180 However, substantial similarity can sometimes be determined as a matter of law, either because no reasonable jury could find
that the two works are substantially similar or because the similarity
concerns only uncopyrightable elements.181
Gaito II reasoned that when a court considers substantial similarity, “no discovery or fact-finding is typically necessary, because ‘what
is required is only a visual comparison of the works.’”182 Drawing on
Walker, the Gaito II court ruled that the text trumps other sources of
interpretive authority — or at least, it can. The court’s language emphasizes formalism: “It is well settled that in ruling on [a motion to
dismiss], a district court may consider ‘the facts as asserted within the
four corners of the complaint’ together with ‘the documents attached
to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the
complaint by reference.’”183
Because the works had been attached to the pleadings as documents for the court to review, the court was deemed to have all it
needed for its ruling.184 Judge Katzmann concluded that “where, as
175. Hamil Am. Inc. v. GFI, 193 F.3d 92, 100 (2d Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
176. Gaito I, 2009 WL 5865686, at *5.
177. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 59, 63.
178. Id. at 63.
179. Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 1980).
180. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 63.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 64 (citation omitted).
183. Id. (citation omitted).
184. See Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“Although substantial similarity analysis often presents questions of fact, where the court
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here, the district court has before it all that is necessary to make a
comparison of the works in question,” it is entirely proper for a court
to decide a motion to dismiss on the basis of substantial similarity (or
the lack thereof).185 According to this view, which subsequent case
law has continued to adopt, the text possesses all the interpretive tools
needed to unlock it, for the purposes of answering the questions copyright would ask of it.186
In Gaito II, following Walker, Judge Katzmann effectively located the court’s interpretive authority in the text, but clarified that in
some cases it might not be proper to decide the question of noninfringement without discovery.187 Implicit in his decision is the idea
that some cases are too complex to be determined without assistance
but that this was not such a case. He cited Computer Associates v.
Altai as an example of when expert testimony might be necessary,
because the “strictures of [the court’s] own lay perspective” might be
too limiting to understand the issues at bar.188
As the analysis above demonstrates, Gaito II adopted formalism
by adhering to the works over and above any sources about or outside
the work. In contrast to formalism, contextualism may start outside
the work189 and may encompass many different interpretive methods,
including an approach that relies heavily on authorial intention or
statements about the author’s work.190
2. Authors’ Statements
For legal analysis, the distinction between the work’s four corners
and the world beyond offers a helpful, bright-line division of evihas before it ‘all that is necessary to make a comparison of the works in question,’ it may
rule on ‘substantial similarity as a matter of law on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.’”)
(citing Gaito II).
185. Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65.
186. See Klauber Bros., Inc. v. Bon-Ton Stores, Inc., 557 F. App’x. 77, 80 (2d Cir.
2014).
187. See Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65.
188. Gaito II, 602 F.3d at 65 (quoting Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992)).
189. Formalism starts and ends with the formal analysis of the work, whereas
contextualism may use as a source for interpreting the work the historical era in which the
work was produced; the unequal power dynamics the work reflects or entrenches;
biographical analysis that shows how the author’s life parallels or diverges from the work;
statements of authorial intention; the conditions of the work’s reception, including analysis
of its audience(s); or the material conditions of the book’s publication and dissemination.
190. These approaches are really all identifiable as critical theory, but they generally
include historicism, Marxism, feminism, post-structuralism, psychoanalysis, biographical
criticism, critical bibliography, post-colonial theory, queer theory, and cultural studies,
among others. JONATHAN CULLER, LITERARY THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION
(1997) at preface. Indeed, contextualist interpretive methods predominate in non-legal
realms, where a backlash against formalism has occupied the humanities since the late
1940s. FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM 305 (1983).
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dence. When judges have before them the works at issue, they can,
under one theory, simply adjudicate those with nothing beyond the
parties’ pleadings.191 However, this formalist approach is not an inevitable way to proceed; alternatives do exist. For instance, a court could
find that an author’s statements about his work, found outside the
work itself, are relevant. A court did so in Blanch v. Koons, granting
deference to Jeff Koons, the appropriation artist who had made unauthorized use of the image of a sandal shot by fashion photographer
Andrea Blanch.192 In the court’s words, “we need not depend on our
own poorly honed artistic sensibilities” when there is “no reason to
question [Koons’s] statement that the use of an existing image advanced his artistic purposes.”193 In so finding, it downplayed other
potential factors, such as formalist dissection, judicial intuition, and
audience responses.
Likewise, in Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin, the court chose a contextualist approach over other possible methods.194 The dispute concerned an unauthorized sequel to Margaret Mitchell’s Gone with the
Wind.195 The trial court used a formalist interpretive lens in finding
Alice Randall’s work, The Wind Done Gone, to be infringing and
granted an injunction.196 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the
preliminary injunction and held that Randall was likely to prevail on
the question of fair use, largely because the circuit court shifted interpretive gears from formalism to contextualism and seemed to recognize in Randall’s efforts a larger social critique of slavery.197 Judge
Birch’s opinion dealt with defendant’s work generously. He immediately characterized Randall’s defenses as “persuasive,” and cited her
stated purpose favorably: “[Randall] persuasively claims that her novel is a critique of GWTW’s depiction of slavery and the Civil-War era
American South. To this end, she appropriated the characters, plot and
major scenes from GWTW . . . .”198 Birch’s summary of her use as
directed toward critique is, in some sense, a legal conclusion. To lead
with this legal conclusion suggests an emphasis on the larger critical
context in which it was written.199 Judge Birch acknowledged the difficult — and subjective — undertaking of finding fair use,200 but did
not appear to do much to minimize his own subjective input.
191. See id. at 59.
192. See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 255 (2d Cir. 2006).
193. Id.
194. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga.
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1272 (11th Cir. 2001).
198. Id. at 1259.
199. See id. at 1270.
200. See id. at 1273 (“[W]e must determine whether the use is fair. In doing so, we are
reminded that literary relevance is a highly subjective analysis ill-suited for judicial inquiry.
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Judge Marcus’s concurrence went further and added more robust
contextualist analysis: “Like a political, thematic, and stylistic negative, The Wind Done Gone inverts Gone With the Wind’s portrait of
race relations of the place and era.”201 Judge Marcus emphasized the
way that The Wind Done Gone had positioned itself as an inversion of
the prior work, which necessarily takes account of the way the book is
intended to be received and its larger critical context. He called the
case an easy one for fair use but stressed the relevance of the books’
“two literary worldviews of . . . perfect polarity,” and thus their involvement in controversies outside the four-corners of the works
themselves.202
Given the concurrence of views between Judge Marcus and Judge
Birch, who seem to differ mostly in degree, it is interesting to note
their departure from Judge Pannell’s far more formalist opinion in the
lower court. Judge Pannell offered more textual analysis, and he
placed less reliance on the social critique of slavery; he wrote:
This new vision [of defendant], however, does not
simply comment on the antebellum South by giving
the untold perspective of a mulatto slave who is sold
from the plantation, develops a relationship with a
caucasian [sic], lives well and travels the world. Rather, the new work tells Gone With the Wind’s story,
using its characters, settings, and plot.203
Judge Pannell’s formalist analysis was responsible for finding a likelihood for plaintiff to prevail on the merits, and an injunction issued.204 Perhaps based on the sheer volume and quality of the amount
copied,205 Pannell’s opinion found that Randall’s story “told” or, in
some sense, stole Mitchell’s story using materials created by the latter. Thus, formalism stressed the works’ similarity; contextualism
stressed the need for so much borrowing. The Eleventh Circuit opinion shows that a contextualist approach that takes full consideration of
the critical context, including the author’s statements about her purpose — which seemed plausible in this case — can lead to a different
outcome.

Thus we are presented with conflicting and opposing arguments relative to the amount taken
and whether it was too much or a necessary amount.”).
201. Id. at 1279–80 (Marcus, J., concurring).
202. Id. at 1278.
203. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga.
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
204. See id. at 1367–70.
205. See id. at 1368 (“The court finds that The Wind Done Gone . . . is substantially
similar to Gone With the Wind in both quantitative and qualitative terms.”).
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3. Historical Context and Genre
Another recent example illustrates what it looks like when a court
deliberately situates its interpretive authority in a work’s context, discussing both genre and historical context. Because the same plaintiff
came before the court multiple times with versions of the same work
(albeit naming different defendants), the court’s various interpretive
approaches can be discerned and meaningfully compared. In two actions based on the same screenplay, before two different judges, the
court made different methodological choices, first grounding its authority in the text and subsequently grounding it in context.
In Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, the actress and author, Emma
Thompson, sought a declaratory judgment of non-infringement for her
screenplay about the unhappy marriage of Euphemia (“Effie”) Gray
and John Ruskin, and the subsequent marriage between Effie and the
pre-Raphaelite painter, John Everett Millais.206 Ruskin and Millais
were important figures from the arts and letters of the Victorian era.207
Eve Pomerance had previously published two screenplays about these
same figures, and when she threatened suit, Effie Film sued for declaratory relief on behalf of Thompson.208 In the course of granting
Effie Film’s 12(c) motion, Judge Oetken of the Southern District of
New York carefully summarized all three of the works at issue.209 In
so doing, he grounded his authority in the texts at issue, adopting a
formalist approach.
In Effie Film, LLC v. Murphy, decided by a different judge on the
same court the following year, Judge Griesa cited to Judge Oetken’s
opinion in Pomerance approvingly.210 Gregory Murphy, an author of
numerous plays and other literary works, had produced a play for the
stage and a screenplay both entitled The Countess, that likewise focused on the Gray-Ruskin marriage, the Gray-Millais romance, and
related historical events.211 In the stage of litigation that concerns us
here, the court had before it Thompson’s complete, allegedly infringing screenplay, and it could have proceeded directly to analyzing the
two works. In so doing, it would have been using a formalist approach
to copyright’s substantial similarity analysis, which is the means of

206. Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id. at 279–90.
210. Effie Film, LLC v. Murphy, 932 F. Supp. 2d 538, 553 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d,
564 F. App’x 631 (2d Cir. 2014) (“Judge Oetken has recently provided an excellent analysis
of copyright law as it applies to works of historical fiction, and even the ‘Effie’ screenplay
itself, in granting an analogous motion in another action brought by Effie Film against
another author of a screenplay based on the same historical events.”).
211. Id. at 542.
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determining whether prima facie infringement has occurred.212 A
great deal of prior case law suggests that courts may grant motions
even at early stages on the basis of nothing more than textual analysis
of the works themselves, with no consideration of context, discovery,
or expert testimony.213 Thus nothing, in theory, prevented the court
from adopting a formalist approach, simply doing a close reading of
the two works, and rendering judgment. Perhaps most importantly,
this would have followed the interpretive approach the court itself had
taken in the Pomerance litigation the year before.
The Effie court did not do so. It made an interpretive choice to
ground its analysis in what might be called a contextualist or historicist reading of the works. Even more precisely, we might call it a
hermeneutically historicist approach.214 Put in less florid terms, the
court was simply contextualizing the works by trying to evoke the
Victorian era, helpfully cataloguing characteristics likely to appear in
any work about that epoch. It is striking that the first things the court
said about the work are not directly about the work at all, but about
the era in which the stories are set:
Both ‘Effie’ and ‘The Countess’ present fictionalized
accounts of the same historical events. Therefore it is
necessary to review the historical episode that both
works draw from . . . . [I]t will be impossible to
gauge the creative similarities of the works without
some grasp of the historical narrative.215
The court stated that substantial similarity analysis was “impossible” without reference to a contextual framework. The court was thus
suggesting that the task of comparing the works — the central task in
any finding of copyright infringement — requires a historically informed interpretation.
212. See Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp. (Gaito II), 602 F.3d 57,
65 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[W]here . . . the district court has before it all that is necessary to make a
comparison of the works in question, it may rule on substantial similarity as a matter of
law . . . .”).
213. See id. at 65–66; see also Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941–42
(10th Cir. 2002); Christianson v. W. Publ’g Co., 149 F.2d 202, 203 (9th Cir. 1945).
214. I qualify my use of the term “historicist” because typically historicism refers to
investigation into the era of a work’s production. The animating idea of historicism, or at
least the new historicism, is that works cannot be understood except as artifacts reflecting
the social ideas and environment, the “network of material practices,” of the time of their
creation. H. Aram Veeser, Introduction, in THE NEW HISTORICISM ix, xi (H. Aram Veeser
ed., 1989). Here instead the approach is informed by historical research, which allows the
court to engage in analysis of copyright doctrines, such as scènes à faire and the
idea/expression dichotomy. The court’s focus nonetheless draws on an approach Paul
Hamilton has identified as hermeneutic historicism, in which “[t]he past is to be understood
on the model of interpreting a text; and texts, literary or otherwise, only have meaning
within an economy of other texts . . . .” PAUL HAMILTON, HISTORICISM 3 (2d ed. 1996).
215. Effie, 932 F. Supp. 2d at 543.
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Put another way: To read the text, the court said, one must look
first outside the text. Remarkably, the court dedicated thirteen paragraphs of its opinion to a summary of the historical moment and to
biographical events that help set the stage for both Effie and The
Countess.216 Yet in the earlier adjudication of this same plaintiff’s
work, the other district court had adopted a different approach. While
the earlier case, Pomerance, acknowledged that the issue of historical
fiction presented particular issues, and mentioned the Victorian era in
passing,217 it devoted the bulk and the emphasis of its opinion to formalism, offering summary and exegetic analysis of the works.218
Pomerance dedicated thirteen paragraphs to the Effie script and fifteen
and eleven to each of defendant Pomerance’s scripts respectively.219
Consider by way of further contrast with Effie’s approach to historical context, Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., a landmark,
if oft-criticized, case about the copyrightability of nonfiction historical
accounts.220 There, the works at issue both took place in Nazi Germany,221 no less complex and important an era than the one discussed in
the Effie litigation. Even though discussion of the historical era depicted in both works was a doctrinally important part of its analysis,222
Hoehling is hardly a model of historicist emphasis. Instead, Hoehling
focuses on copyright’s subject matter limitations as a matter of sound
public policy, sidestepping close analysis of the works after simply

216. See id. at 543–45.
217. See Effie Film, LLC v. Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d 273, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
218. In its approach, Pomerance appears to follow the classic Learned Hand opinion,
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, providing what looks like a close reading and doing no
more than acknowledging the historical era with a quick textual nod. Compare Pomerance,
909 F. Supp. 2d at 278, with Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 49 (2d
Cir. 1936).
219. See Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 279–90.
220. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980); see Nash v.
CBS, 899 F.2d 1537, 1542 (7th Cir. 1990) (criticizing Hoehling for failing to generate
incentives efficiently); 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:63 (2014) (“Difficulties . . . have arisen
in the area of history as the result of a poor first analysis . . . . Judge Hand’s comments
reflect a naïve and blinkered understanding of how history is written . . . . [N]o narrative can
be, as Hand suggested, a self-defining, self-selecting, self-ordering aggregation of
facts . . . .”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Sabotaging and Reconstructing History: A Comment on the
Scope of Copyright Protection in Works of History after Hoehling v. Universal City Studios,
29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 647, 648 (1982) (“The Hoehling court’s approach is
fundamentally flawed for at least five reasons.”).
221. Hoehling, 618 F.2d at 975.
222. See id. at 979 (“[A]ll three works contain a scene in a German beer hall, in which
the airship’s crew engages in revelry prior to the voyage[,] . . . common German greetings
of the period, such as ‘Heil Hitler,’ or songs, such as the German National anthem. These
elements, however, are merely scenes a faire . . . .”).
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offering peremptory summaries.223 Hoehling chooses an interpretive
methodology rooted in copyright instrumentalism.224
The Effie court made a different choice by including thirteen paragraphs of historical background. As this historical background both
preceded and, in some sense, preempted formalist analysis, the choice
arguably determined the court’s disposition in finding no infringement.225 The court could have selected other interpretive methods,
such as the “total concept and feel” test.226 Generally, this impressionbased judgment leads more easily to the conclusion of infringement
when two works possess many similarities, even if the particular similarities are historical facts and thus unprotectable in their own right.227
The decision of the Effie court to ground its interpretive authority
in a historicist reading, thus emphasizing or inflating historical context
and downplaying text, reflects an important interpretive choice. To be
sure a historicist or contextualist approach may be more appropriate in
historical or biographical genres, where the copyright protection is
already thin and the presence of common historical elements is more
likely. After all, both works strive for fidelity to the same historical
era, even if differently conceived.
Judges can and do apply contextualist approaches to fiction too.
In particular, when judges look at the question of genre they are analyzing the context in which the work may be understood. A hardboiled detective novel, for instance, looks extremely similar to another
in its genre, until one considers that certain common tropes, plots,
characters, and settings are likely to exist in both. Thus, part of the
work of decoding a text is situating it in terms of its semiotic context,
including its genre.228 Courts have recognized that, at times, a genre

223. Id. at 978 (“To avoid a chilling effect on authors who contemplate tackling an
historical issue or event, broad latitude must be granted to subsequent authors who make use
of historical subject matter, including theories or plots.”).
224. See Pomerance, 909 F. Supp. 2d at 295 (“To achieve that end, Hoehling prioritizes
an instrumental conception of copyright law and concludes that weak copyright protections
will best facilitate the creation and dissemination of new historical knowledge.”).
225. This is not to say that an historical or contextualist approach would always lead to a
finding of non-infringement; at times the use of particular interpretive approaches reflects,
as much as anything else, a commitment to judicial pragmatism, or perhaps a commitment
to an outcome, where analysis is instrumentally serving that outcome.
226. See supra Part II.D.
227. See Alfred C. Yen, A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression
Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total Concept and Feel,” 38 EMORY L.J. 393, 411
(1989) (“If copyright claims can in fact be maintained at such a high level of abstraction,
practically any similarity could conceivably support a finding of infringement.”); Lemley,
supra, note 40, at 739.
228. See Said, supra note 28, at 365 (“Typically, what texts demand of us, whether they
are visual or verbal texts, is at least in part a function of genre. Texts, whether verbal or
visual, are often virtually incomprehensible without reference to the generic tradition to
which they belong, however uneasily.”).
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makes demands on a work and limits authorial choices.229 Where that
is true, similarity analysis must filter out the “elements dictated by
efficiency, necessity, or external factors.”230
In conclusion, nearly all copyright cases reflect clear interpretive
choices. Some cases display a marked reliance on one interpretive
modality; still others feature a mélange of methods. Many cases make
no mention of interpretive methods as such, yet the method — and
their evidentiary and decisional implications — can be discerned in
most copyright cases. Examples from the case law demonstrate that,
at present, courts shift between these interpretive gears, without explaining their choices even when those may be influential upon the
case’s disposition. These cases illustrate that judges make affirmative
choices about their own interpretive authority. These choices are not
merely aesthetic;231 they are methodological choices that are legally
relevant levers in litigation. Judges may choose to ground their interpretive authority in a single source of authority, or they may discuss
multiple authoritative grounds. Sometimes they offer no justifications
for their finding,232 or they offer reasons without explaining their relative weight.233
Loosely, one might say that judges most commonly choose analysis over intuition and text over context, and some opinions will lean
more heavily on one axis.234 In many cases, a mix of approaches exists. In rare cases, judges emphasize authorial intention. Finally, judges, in their frequent reliance on the “total concept and feel” of a work,
cast as an element of the work what is actually a method, intuitionism.
It is important to distinguish between what is in the work from how to
approach it, methodologically. Such distinctions can carry legal
weight, and they arise to our attention only once it is acknowledged
that copyright possesses many interpretive pressure points, featuring
multiple interpretive choices.

229. See, e.g, Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 856 (6th Cir. 2003); Matthew Bender &
Co. v. West Publ’n Co., 158 F.3d 674, 682 (2d Cir. 1998); Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v.
Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 707–08 (2d Cir. 1992).
230. Trek Leasing, Inc. v. U.S., 66 Fed. Cl. 8, 16 (Fed. Cl. 2005).
231. Pace Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903). See supra
Part II.D.
232. For example, in substantial similarity analysis, as when the text is seen to speak for
itself. See supra Part II.E.
233. For instance, their reasons may track the fair use factors, but one factor may
inexplicably trump the others, or reflect unclear and indeterminate analysis. Joseph Liu,
Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 573 (2007) (“A significant problem
with the current four-factor fair use test is its indeterminacy. Courts and commentators have
long complained that the existing four-factor test provides scant guidance to those who
would engage in fair uses.”).
234. I qualify my assessments about the frequency of the use of particular approaches.
These are not empirically tested claims. They simply reflect my opinion after reading,
writing about, teaching, and rereading many copyright cases.

No. 2]

Reforming Copyright Interpretation

503

III. COPYRIGHT’S INTERPRETIVE CHOICE REGIME IS COMPLEX
Interpretive issues in copyright are difficult and militate in favor
of a doctrine that guides judges rather than assuming they already
possess all the tools they might need for the task. Copyright law
should recognize that analysis of copyrightable works is methodologically embedded in an intellectual history, both deep and wide, of sophisticated methods of interpretation in which judges already
participate.
A. All Copyrightable Works Are Complex
Judges in copyright cases sometimes assume that nontechnical
works in copyright cases are not complex and thus do not require
methodologically explicit interpretation. This view is incorrect: Both
the analysis and the works analyzed are complex, dynamic things and
should be acknowledged as such. Judges have to make difficult methodological decisions no less complex than those required of them
when confronted with technical (software) cases. However, courts and
scholars have not generally acknowledged the inevitable complexity
in copyright cases, while they have done so in technical cases.
Elsewhere in the law, when judges face complex or “polycentric”
issues or issues that explicitly require interpretation, they offer reasons and otherwise explain their work. Typically in such cases, judges
receive expert evidence to guide their analysis. By contrast, in copyright law, when questions of interpretation grow very complex, judges
sometimes offer conclusions with little to no support or explanation.235 Judges sometimes proceed as though expressive works were
effectively self-interpreting, facially clear, and thus semiotically accessible.236 Tushnet has referred to this as a judicial tendency to treat
certain works as though they were “transparent,” that is, clear on their
surfaces and thus requiring no interpretive apparatus.237 Displaying
what Tushnet has aptly called, in the context of visual works, “the
epistemic hubris” of copyright law, judges see fit to make rulings on
artistic works as though these objects of study required no special
methodology.238 That is, they can be said to treat expressive works as
235. See Farley, supra note 12, at 838–39 (“Probably the most prevalent way that courts
deal with the tension . . . is simply to reach a conclusion on that question without including
any supporting analysis . . . . The courts must have relied on certain ideas about the nature
of art, but no reasoning was articulated.”).
236. The view of texts as self-explicating or semiotically autonomous is discernible in
judicial language stressing that artistic works themselves supersede any statements of them,
as discussed supra with respect to dicta in Gaito II and Walker. See supra Part II.E.
237. Tushnet, supra note 22, at 687.
238. Id. at 721; see Folio Impressions Inc. v. Byers Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 766 (2d Cir.
1991) (requiring only a visual comparison of the works).
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if they were transparent (Tushnet’s language) or autonomous (this
Article’s language).
To be sure, this judicial tendency toward textual autonomy is efficient, since it collapses the possibilities of the multiple into the certitude of the singular.239 Yet this interpretive hubris also at times
betrays an interpretive provincialism. Some judges seem to think that
certain objects of their analysis are hard, and some are easier. Computer Associates v. Altai, a case that has become a lynchpin in copyright’s infringement analysis, held that it was simply “the reality that
computer programs are likely to be somewhat impenetrable by lay
observers — whether they be judges or juries,” and it argued that it
could not “disregard the highly complicated and technical subject
matter at the heart of these claims.”240 Likewise this language, from a
piece of scholarship published in a highly respected law review, captures the idea:
Unfortunately, while judges are commonly familiar
with literature, they are not necessarily familiar with
the intricacies of computer technology. Judges have
well-developed intuitions about what is and is not
important in comparing two works of literature. One
cannot hope for a similar understanding of computer
programming, due to its more technical nature.241
The patronizing tone here reflects the idea that “nontechnical,”
expressive works are accessible to judges because of their training in
(what in our era, in our country happens to be considered by many)
the humanistic discipline of law.242 By contrast, judges are thought to
lack the expertise to weigh in on complex software matters since legal
training does not equip judges with familiarity in computer code languages.243 This presumption is not just a philistine nuisance; it has
unfortunate ramifications for copyright law, as the next two subparts
argue.

239. See Tushnet, supra note 22, at 688.
240. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).
241. David W.T. Daniels, Learned Hand Never Played Nintendo: A Better Way To Think
About the Non-Literal, Non-Visual Software Copyright Cases, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 635
(1994).
242. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Refining Notions of Idea and Expression Through
Linguistic Analysis, in COPYRIGHT AND PIRACY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 204
(Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2010) (“[C]ourts, who work daily with words, perhaps
instinctively believe they understand the nature of literary works.”).
243. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 713; Lee, supra note 16.
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B. Analysis of Copyrightable Works Is Interpretively Complex
At present, a consensus seems to exist that copyright adjudication
does not require complex interpretive work of judges when they adjudicate expressive and artistic or “nontechnical” works.244 Copyright
law contrasts expressive works with technical works such as software;
the former are thought not to require particular training or sophistication for their adjudication. Both the works and the analysis necessary
to adjudicate them are cast as nontechnical and thus accessible. Judges
are thought to be able to decode the works at issue simply by having
them in front of them; dicta refer to the way that texts offer a kind of
testimony that judicial common sense can simply discern: “the ‘mute
testimony’ of the forms put him in as good a position as the Copyright
Office to decide the issue,”245 and “[g]ood eyes and common sense
may be as useful as deep study of reported and unreported cases,
which themselves are tied to highly particularized facts.”246 Some
courts only allude to the purported simplicity of the work before them,
while others say so outright: “[T]he Court recognizes that the task of
comparing two fiction works is not highly technical, and indeed requires no specific training . . . .”247
In fact, however, the analysis of these works is methodologically
complex. One court has bemoaned the “turbid water of the ‘extrinsic
test’” and referred to its application in one context as a “somewhat
unnatural task, guided by relatively little precedent.”248 When judges
interpret an artistic text, they are necessarily making a set of
unacknowledged methodological choices that presuppose anterior
interpretive and theoretical judgments.249
Experience or expertise surely increases the ability to make those
judgments. Judge Richard Posner, also the author of a widely disseminated book on law and literature acknowledges that, at least in one
context of copyright law, judges must make judgments based on their
interpretation of the works at issue.250 He argues that judges often
must be able to grasp the point of a parody in order to find it noninfringing.251 To that end, he thinks literariness a virtue, suggesting
244. See Altai, 982 F.2d at 713; Lemley supra note 40 (describing the state of the law).
245. Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985)
(referring approvingly to Judge Wexler’s reasoning in the lower court’s decision).
246. Klauber Bros., Inc. v. Russell-Newman, Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4985(PGG), 2013 WL
1245456, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2013) (referring to the lower court’s decision).
247. Gable v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, 438 F.
App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2011).
248. Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841, 848 (9th Cir. 2004).
249. See Zahr Said Stauffer, ‘Po-Mo Karaoke’ or Postcolonial Pastiche? What Fair Use
Analysis Could Draw from Literary Criticism, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 43, 49–50 (2007).
250. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 544
(3d ed. 2010).
251. See id. (“The more literary the judges, the greater the probability of finding [the]
point” of the parody.).
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that expertise helps what is otherwise a complex task.252 Many judges
do not seem to view any particular expertise as necessary to the task
of adjudicating copyright disputes over expressive, nontechnical
works.
Yet the complex task of adjudicating expressive works in copyright cases always requires some methodological choice. This is true
even when judges speak from an analytical stance clothed in intuition,
that is, a stance that appears to consist merely of common law-style
legal reasoning. Professor Adrian Vermeule writes, “[t]he idea that
judges should take each case as it comes, interpreting statutes sensibly
in light of the materials at hand, itself constitutes an implicit choice of
interpretive method and an implicit allocation of interpretive authority.”253 Intuitionism is a choice, as is the refusal to apply a particular
method or to give reasons. These choices differ from conventional
interpretive methods, but they should be viewed as methods judges
sometimes choose.
The interpretive choices attaching to expressive works are necessarily complex, and how to negotiate these choices is by no means
clear. The works themselves are also semiotically complex. Still,
many courts proceed as though interpretive choices with respect to
expressive works are unnecessary, and adjudicating cases concerning
artistic works is easier than resolving questions raised by cases concerning technology and science. The perceived lack of complexity
means no robust methodology for how to analyze these works has
emerged. Yet for matters of law, judges exercise a great deal of discretion — indeed they have nearly unfettered access to a range of interpretive choices — and they usually decide, without external
constraints, what interpretive sources they will select. Judges lack
clear guidance on what to do when confronted with expressive or artistic works, because at present there is little awareness of the interpretive complexity inherent in these works.
C. Scholarly Awareness of Copyright’s Interpretive Complexity Is
Growing
Despite the prevailing view in case law that complexity tracks
technicality, thus making nontechnical works presumptively noncomplex, recent scholarship has begun to explore copyright’s interpretive complexity. Though this emerging body of scholarship has not
emphasized interpretive method selection, it acknowledges assumptions about copyright’s inherent complexity in its attempts to locate
heuristics to clarify copyright analysis.

252. Id.
253. Vermeule, supra note 15, at 97.
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In copyright law, the question of “originality as a legal construct”
offers certain challenges in the contemporary creation landscape.254
Professor Ed Lee has argued that originality, though historically a
simple determination, may have grown more difficult to decide in the
digital era.255 Nonetheless, judges at present do have what Lee characterizes as “considerable discretion to decide the issue” of originality,
and Lee laments that “the precise contours of [its] requirements remain obscure.”256 Professor Eva Subotnik has suggested that maintaining a low threshold for copyright makes sense.257 This would seem
to allow judges to do as little normative analysis as possible in an area
fraught with aesthetic complexity.
Both Subotnik and Lee propose certain heuristics to try to reduce
uncertainty, the former as a three-part test, the latter as a set of proxies. Subotnik writes, “[c]aught between the impermissibility of relying
upon aesthetic virtues, on the one hand, and the degree of effort expended by an author, on the other, the closest courts can come to identifying originality, at least under the current copyright framework, is
through proxies for the legal concept.”258 Subotnik’s suggested use of
proxies underscores the complex work that judges do and the difficulty they have had in articulating, let alone employing, interpretive
methodology consistently. Likewise, Lee has proposed a heuristic
designed to resolve problems arising from uncertainty around what
authorship and originality mean in the digital era.259 Lee’s model
would introduce authorial intent in combination with other factors,
rather than focusing on only the text.260 In his emphasis on authorial
efforts and skill, Lee acknowledges that independent creation will
feature “a wide degree of subjective choices by the artist.”261 These
choices seem likely to introduce issues of subtlety and complexity
sufficient to make administering originality tests very difficult, absent
clear guidance with respect to interpretation. It is striking, though, that
both Subotnik and Lee seek to introduce legal strategies to guide
judges, which is an indication of copyright’s inherent complexity.
Relatedly, in the fixation context, scholars have noted the intricate
theoretical questions judges must decide; difficulty is arguably augmented by lack of clarity as a matter of interpretive method. For instance, discussion of whether a work is “fixed” for the purposes of
copyright’s fixation requirement requires selection of an interpretive
254. See Eva E. Subotnik, Originality Proxies: Toward a Theory of Copyright and
Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1490 (2011).
255. Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919 (2012).
256. Id. at 920.
257. Subotnik, supra note 254, at 1495.
258. Id. at 1494.
259. Lee, supra note 255, at 936.
260. See id. at 937.
261. Id. at 940.
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method with which to proceed. Interpretive methods could vary in
how to define the work, including how to conceptualize what counts
as its “text” versus its context. For example, if the context around a
work affects the work, does it erode the boundaries of the work? Put
another way, once the text and context have been defined, what effect
should context have on text, in a court’s definition of a work’s fixation? A court asked an intriguing version of this question recently: If a
horticultural sculpture is eroded by wind and rain, does it change so
much that it can no longer be considered fixed?262 Or perhaps a garden lies at the other end of the spectrum — it changes too much by its
very nature to be considered properly fixed in the first place:
“[G]ardens are planted and cultivated, not authored. A garden’s constituent elements are alive and inherently changeable, not fixed.”263
Kelley’s fixation question tees up the difficulty of defining a work for
the purposes of copyright law.
How one frames what counts as “the work” in the first place is
largely a function of interpretive method selection.264 Robert Rotstein
has shown how bringing aesthetic theories to copyright law reveals a
disconnect between the legal notion of a work as fixed and immutable, and the literary notion of a text as inherently mutable.265 Unlike
the stable and autonomous “work,” which the law treats as akin to an
object, the text is a process — an act of speech that occurs when a
member of an audience (a reader, viewer, listener, computer operator)
interacts with the textual artifact (that is, the book, motion picture,
song, or computer program). Thus, for example, the song The Boxer
in 1969 was a different “text” from The Boxer in 1981, because the
listeners in each case “created” different texts.266 Rotstein’s view of
the text as functionally dependent on its reader may overstate the critical influence of reception theory. Whether or not that view is accurate, it highlights the normative nature of defining the boundaries and
function of a work of authorship for the purposes of copyright law.
Similarly, Professor Michael Madison has examined the constructedness of the notion of the work and urged scholars to treat the
boundaries of a work with greater fluidity.267 Professor Laura Heymann has drawn attention to the way that fixation delineates a legally
constructed line around a work, and she stresses the fact that its

262. Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2011).
263. Id. at 304.
264. Robert H. Rotstein, Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of
the Work, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 727 (1992) (“Contemporary literary theory has
vigorously debated the significance of the mutability of ‘works of authorship.’”).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Michael J. Madison, IP Things as Boundary Objects: The Case of the Copyright
Work 2 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-12, 2013), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2256255.
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boundaries are not otherwise aesthetically fixed or inevitable.268 For
Heymann, fixation is what “creates both an author and a commodifiable subject, neither of which exists as a legal entity in copyright law
before the act of fixation occurs.”269 Her analysis sheds nuanced light
on the complex boundary that fixation creates:
It transforms the creative process (and its subject)
from a contextual, dynamic entity into an acontextual, static one, rendering the subject archived, searchable, and subject to further appropriation. Even in
contexts in which there is no competing claim as to
control, fixation still works to bound the fruits of
creative effort, engendering distance between the author and audience. Fixation thus causes a kind of
death in creativity even as it births new legal rights.
Once an “author” has fixed a certain version of her
work, she has propertized its subject, subordinating
the work to the various laws and tropes that come
with a property-based regime such as copyright law:
ownership, transformation, borrowing, and theft.
Fixation is what allows the subject to be commercialized and analyzed; it is what marks the transformation to subject in the first place.270
In Heymann’s vision, the dynamism of interpretive fluidity yields
to static lines the law draws in order to demarcate — and contain —
property. Heymann’s account of the “work” hints at the semiotic play
between the various interpretive grounds in which authority can lie. If
a judge grounds interpretive authority in the text (in Kelley, it was the
horticultural sculpture), then changes like those made by the wind, the
rain, and the fauna in Kelley would dictate a finding of non-fixation,
and thus uncopyrightability. If a judge focuses on the work as something that exists in perpetual dialogue with its audience, thus embracing a reader-response theory, or a contextualist approach, a work’s
contours will seem less defined. Viewed with such a lens, the work
will evolve as perceptions of it evolve. Consequently, it would likely
be held to be unfixed by its nature, like the garden in Kelley, unless an
argument could be made that the work required flux and growth as
part of its reception, without losing copyright protection altogether.
Interestingly, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s estate attempted to make a
version of this argument in order to extend copyright in Sherlock
268. Laura A. Heymann, How To Write A Life: Some Thoughts on Fixation and the
Copyright/Privacy Divide, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 829–30 (2009).
269. Id. at 830.
270. Id.
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Holmes, but the court rejected this line of reasoning as an end-run
around the limited duration requirement.271 This brief discussion of
the “work” as a legal construct shows yet another way in which interpretive methods can make a legally relevant difference by invalidating
for lack of fixation a copyright that otherwise appears valid.
Recent scholarship attests to copyright’s inherent interpretive
complexity. Scholars have responded by proposing heuristics and trying to accurately diagnose when and where these difficulties arise.
Scholars’ view of copyright law, however, does not align with the
judicial presumption, alive and well in most circuits, that copyright
law in nontechnical works is not interpretively complex and does not
require special treatment or judicial guidance.
D. Judges Receive Little Guidance and Have Much Discretion
Conceiving of expressive works — and the analysis they require — as non-complex has two further consequences for copyright
law. First, expert testimony tends to be disallowed on questions that
are nonetheless difficult and could benefit from illumination by experts. Second, copyright imposes no requirement that judges be transparent about how they decide where to ground their interpretive
authority and how much weight to accord any one source.272 Because
the question is not considered difficult at present, its resolution requires no scrutiny and imposes no constraints. We might shrug and
conclude that this flexibility is a characteristic aspect and one of the
chief benefits of the common law system. Yet elsewhere in copyright’s analysis, judges do face some procedural constraints, and it is
unclear that the scope of interpretive latitude exists by design, rather
than because judicial interpretation has escaped our collective focus.273 Indeed, the proper scope of judicial discretion in choosing
how, when, and even whether to interpret the works in copyright cases
can be evaluated only once it is clear that copyright law routinely requires that judges face these choices and that these choices are complex.
Indeed, a robust literature exists outside of copyright law that puts
copyright’s interpretive regime into helpful perspective. In other areas
of law similar questions have long been considered because of their
271. Klinger v. Conan Doyle Estate, Ltd., 755 F.3d 496, 503 (7th Cir. 2014) (“[The
characters] were “incomplete” only in the sense that Doyle might want to (and later did) add
additional features to their portrayals.”).
272. See supra Part II.A.
273. Some areas of copyright leave judges with little discretion, either because the statute
contains a provision that is more rule-like than standards-like, or because the law of
particular jurisdictions has evolved in that fashion. For instance, in some circuits, judges
cannot admit expert testimony or engage in analytic dissection during the second stage of
substantial similarity analysis. Lemley, supra note 40, at 723.
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importance for doctrine and outcomes alike. Professor Kent
Greenawalt has enumerated “dimensions of inquiry” arising in interpreting wills and contracts.274 He frames a list of binarisms to help
determine how meaning should be derived from the text: Writer or
reader? Subjective or objective? Abstract or contextual? Specific aim
or general objective? Document or external evidence? Time of writing
or time of interpretation?275 Those questions already arise in copyright
cases, and judges are often pressed to answer them in some form, with
little guidance. Judges in copyright cases make interpretive selections
with little to no discussion of their choices being embedded in a larger
critical conversation on interpretive theory, in both law and aesthetics.
Partly because the interpretive decision-making process lies below the
surface it remains malleable and produces inconsistent results. At present, judges may rely on whatever interpretive methods seem to them
to be warranted, without explaining why. Even within the focus on
one of these sources, the analysis is not consistent or coherent across
courts. With respect to the focus on audience, for instance, the judicial
analysis appears circuit dependent and seems to consist of a hybrid of
standards.276 Demonstrably, though, judges choose to prioritize one
method of interpretation over another, without saying that — or
why — they are doing so, thus creating a confused and confusing
body of law.277
These interpretive tensions exist in aesthetics as well. Rita Felski,
a contemporary literary critic, has written: “We inflate context, in
short, in order to deflate text; while newly magnified social conditions
dispose and determine, the artwork flickers and grows dim.”278 Felski’s almost plaintive tone is in some sense trying to capture the difficult analytic balance between a text’s clearly internal factors and its
external ones.279 Her comment evokes a longstanding set of debates
over grounds of interpretive authority in schools of aesthetic and critical thought. These debates suggest that in the competition for interpre274. Kent Greenawalt, A Pluralist Approach to Interpretation: Wills and Contracts, 42
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 533, 541–43 (2005).
275. Id.
276. See Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley, The Audience in Intellectual Property
Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1251, 1273 (2014).
277. Yen, supra note 10, at 250 (“Analytically inconsistent cases [] exist simultaneously
as ‘good law.’ . . . [T]he precedent which governs new cases may be inconsistent.”).
278. Rita Felski, Context Stinks!, 42 NEW LIT. HIST. 573, 582 (2011).
279. I acknowledge that the distinction between internal and external is reductionist, even
problematic. The point of new historicism, after all, is to suggest that what I am calling
external factors cannot be divorced from the way the text comes together; its social moment
produces the text, suggesting that any internal/external binarism is destined to fail. What is
outside the text (history) is necessarily contained within it under a theory that says that
historical forces have contributed to shaping all texts. For the moment, I set aside these
admittedly difficult textual metaphysics. Here, I mean simply to refer to internal in its
formalist or four-corners meaning and external to mean extrinsic or metatextual, that is,
non-formalist approaches to the text. See Said, supra note 28, at 361.
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tive authority, internal and external sources compete. When the socalled “death of the author” occurs, thus lifting the reader to semiotic
prominence, Roland Barthes writes, “the birth of the reader must be
requited by the death of the Author.”280 The different approaches taken by the two courts in Cariou reflect this potentially deep methodological divide,281 one to which scholars of aesthetics and humanities
are highly sensitized, since the politics of interpretation occupy center
stage in those fields of inquiry. Of course, interpretive choices about
method also matter a great deal to legal outcomes. Because these
choices matter, it is worth underscoring that they are difficult to make,
full of semiotic, legal, and factual complexity.
Despite this significant complexity, as it now stands, most circuits
do not allow judges to receive a great deal of assistance from experts
on what are arguably the hardest interpretive questions.282 This may
be a consequence of the enduring fallacy that artistic works are not
deserving of, or rather, do not require technical interpretation in the
way that technical works, such as computer software programs, do.283
Even when it is allowed, expert evidence plays a much more minor
role in copyright law than it could play.284 Indeed, judges routinely
deny or seem to ignore interpretive assistance when it is proffered.285
Recognizing the genuine challenges of copyright’s interpretive complexity could affect when and whether to admit expert testimony to
assist fact-finders.
At common law, the standard for infringement was whether an
ordinary observer would recognize a work as having been impermissibly copied by another.286 Altai held that expert testimony could be
admitted in the narrow cases of complex works that might be too difficult for lay observers to understand.287 Altai thus reaffirmed “the
traditional role of lay observers in judging substantial similarity in
copyright cases that involve the aesthetic arts, such as music, visual
works or literature.”288 Similarly, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow held
that the ordinary observer test should not be applied in “cases involving exceptionally difficult materials,” because cases involving software infringement might possess “complexity and unfamiliarity to
most members of the public.”289
280. ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in THE RUSTLE OF LANGUAGE 49, 55
(Richard Howard trans., 1986).
281. See supra Part II.C.
282. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 726; supra Part II.A.
283. See supra Part III.A.
284. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 724.
285. Salinger v. Colting, 607 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir. 2010) (ignoring expert evidence from
experts presenting arguments in favor of finding a fair use).
286. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713–14 (2d Cir. 1992).
287. See supra Part III.A.
288. Altai, 982 F.2d at 713–14.
289. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232–33 (3d Cir. 1986).
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Technical subject matter commonly merits expert testimony, yet
courts continue to hold that the aesthetic arts need no expertise beyond that of the lay observer — a standard applied by the factfinder,
very often the judge.290 The admissibility of expert testimony is subject to court discretion under the federal rules of evidence, guided by
the premise that the testimony “will help the trier of fact to understand
the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.”291 However, with regard
to nontechnical works courts have found expert testimony unnecessary.292
Much subsequent case law has reaffirmed this distinction between
technical and accessible, unfamiliar and familiar, scientific and artistic, hard and easy, subject matter. Important legal consequences flow
from this simplistic set of distinctions, which are, perhaps, reflected in
the entrenchment of the terms “soft intellectual property” (referring to
copyright, trademark, trade secret, and trade dress law), and “hard
intellectual property” (referring to patent law).293 In a majority of circuits, judges are permitted to consider expert testimony in cases with
technical issues, even when such testimony would be excluded in cases with nontechnical issues.294
Most circuits do not allow expert analysis on the question of
whether copying was improper.295 Not all copying is unlawful, yet
discerning what has been copied — and why — can be an extraordinarily difficult exercise in line drawing. It may seem counterintuitive,
then, that the majority of courts exclude expert testimony during the
stage of the analysis when analysis seems to grow most complex.296
Even when, in theory, courts could admit expert testimony, judges
frequently view such evidence with wariness. An early example
comes from Judge Learned Hand, who refused to consider expert testimony as to substantial similarity in the classic case of Nichols v.

290. See Gable v. NBC, 727 F. Supp. 2d 815, 834 (C.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d, Gable v. NBC,
438 F. App’x 587 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he Court recognizes that the task of comparing two
fiction works is not highly technical, and indeed requires no specific training.”).
291. FED. R. EVID. 702.
292. See Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283, 295 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he
subject matter is not complex or technical, such as a computer program or a functional
object . . . but instead involves a literary work aimed at a general audience, [so] expert
testimony will seldom be necessary to determine substantial similarity.”).
293. See, e.g., Marc E. Hankin, Comment, Now That We Know “The Way Forward,” Let
Us Stay the Course, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1295, 1298–99 (2002); Irina D. Manta, The
Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
469, 471 (2011); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for Trade Secret, 74
OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 668 (2013). But see Eric Goldman, 18 NO. 2 CYBERSPACE LAW. 11
(2013) (calling into question the validity of the soft/hard distinction).
294. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713 (2d Cir. 1992).
295. Lemley, supra note 40, at 726.
296. See Balganesh, Manta & Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 82, at 272–73.
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Universal.297 As a methodological manifesto in the making, it is worth
quoting in full:
We cannot approve the length of the record, which
was due chiefly to the use of expert witnesses. Argument is argument whether in the box or at the bar,
and its proper place is the last. The testimony of an
expert upon such issues, especially his crossexamination, greatly extends the trial and contributes
nothing which cannot be better heard after the evidence is all submitted. It ought not to be allowed at
all; and while its admission is not a ground for reversal, it cumbers the case and tends to confusion, for
the more the court is led into the intricacies of dramatic craftsmanship, the less likely it is to stand upon
the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered
impressions upon its own perusal. We hope that in
this class of cases such evidence may in the future be
entirely excluded, and the case confined to the actual
issues; that is, whether the copyrighted work was
original, and whether the defendant copied it, so far
as the supposed infringement is identical.298
Though in the case of Nichols, factors particular to the litigation
may have disinclined Judge Learned Hand from taking expert evidence seriously, many subsequent cases have evinced this similarly
bristling attitude towards it. Even those judges who seem not to object
to expert opinions scarcely welcome them. In Tisi v. Patrick, for instance, the court viewed the expert opinion as little more than window
dressing to judicial intuition:
This action requires an analysis of the common and
unique aspects of the two rock music compositions at
issue . . . . Thanks to the skill of counsel and the clarity of the Defendants’ expert witness, the unfamiliarity of the court with the genre has been overcome. A
combination of common sense and a hastily trained
ear dictate the forthcoming result.299
To be sure, the expert witness assisted, but the outcome relied on judicial “common sense” as much as anything else.

297. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930).
298. Nichols, 45 F.2d, at 123 (emphasis added).
299. Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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In sum, because judges do not acknowledge that they are making
choices about their interpretive methodologies, their opinions can —
and often do — reflect interpretive judgments that appear to be driven
more by outcome than consistency, coherence, or expert guidance.
That is, on a crucial underlying aspect of copyright adjudication,
judges frequently move the goalposts in ways that frustrate the goals
of predictability, fairness, and accountability in litigation.
Copyright law should abandon its non-complexity premise, with
respect to the work it requires of judges and the interpretively complex nature of expressive works. The consequences of assuming noncomplexity are that expert guidance is disallowed right when it is
most needed, and judges are not attentive to their interpretive methodology with expressive works because none appears necessary. The
interpretive complexity inherent in copyrightable works supports the
conclusion that copyright adjudication would benefit from greater
transparency and more judicial guidance with respect to choice of
interpretive methods. Acknowledging complexity underscores the
benefit of an approach that emphasizes judicial analysis and downplays intuition, except in cases when intuition is acknowledged as its
own method of interpretation.

IV. DOCTRINE SHOULD STRUCTURE JUDGES’ INTERPRETIVE
CHOICES
Doctrine should play a bigger role in shaping, perhaps constraining, judicial decisions regarding interpretation in copyright cases.
Copyright’s interpretive choice regime reflects its doctrinal complexity, and these choices matter to outcomes. Interpretive choices can
control questions of major importance for the parties, such as whether
an issue may be decided at summary judgment, whether expert testimony is allowed or required, and whether a use is fair (among multiple other doctrinal issues). Characterizing what copyright demands of
judges helps clarify the proper scope of their authority and the proper
tools for them to use in exercising it. Currently, the lack of structure
that characterizes copyright’s interpretive practices creates unpredictability and unfairness for the parties. Ultimately, the approach likely
to produce the greatest predictability and fairness is one that incentivizes judges to produce analysis-structured reasoning rather than intuition-based judgments and that constrains judicial discretion over
interpretive choice by defaulting to a focus on the text and the context
only when necessary. This approach effectively relies on doctrine to
structure judicial choices more consistently.
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A. Interpretive Choice Belongs with the Judge
One of the chief benefits of recharacterizing judicial practices in
copyright as interpretively complex, as Part III has done, is being able
to address the allocation of decisional authority more precisely. Judges in copyright cases are called on to make complex interpretive
choices about how to read a given work. While judges may not need a
hearing simply on the interpretive issues in a copyright case, it is not
unreasonable to think they might, in some cases, benefit from expert
testimony or from extrinsic evidence that goes beyond the four corners of the work. The discretion to decide should be, however, not a
doctrinal rule — as it is in copyright now, existing in an incoherent
patchwork of different circuits’ rules — but a matter for judicial decision-making. Copyright judges should continue to exercise their authority to make interpretive choices about the works they adjudicate,
and they should do so largely as a matter of law, with exceptions discussed below. This is important because judges may choose from
many different interpretive methods and could be encouraged to do
so, so long as their reasoning remains transparent and is thoroughly
explained. Keeping key interpretive questions with the judge and emphasizing analysis over intuition, and text over context, could allow
courts to dispose of more cases through early stage motions, without
the need for a fuller record or a full trial. In turn, this would have the
salutary effect of minimizing the need for jury trials and, perhaps,
shorten the timeline of copyright litigation generally.
B. Judges Should Rely on Texts as a Default
Our current regime provides judicial discretion over interpretive
choice, with no mandate for transparency about the methodological
choices that exist and that judges select. Greater constraints on this
discretionary power make a good deal of sense if the goal is to make
copyright law more consistent and predictable. In a two-tiered structure, judges deciding issues as a matter of law could default to the text
as a source of interpretive authority, but proceed to other interpretive
grounds, if such a departure is warranted. This would create greater
predictability in outcomes and could minimize litigation time and expense.
Text-based interpretation is well-suited to analysis by a single individual with the ability to “read” evidence like the patterns created
through dissection or other “objective” analysis. While not every
reader will draw the same conclusions from a set of similarities, the
similarities are often inarguably present or absent. That is, parties can
point to a list of similarities that is either more or less convincing, but
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that amounts to external, objective evidence.300 When parties offer a
battle of the lists of similar features, judges can evaluate the strength
of these lists against a baseline of their own extrinsic analysis of the
works. Apples can be compared to apples and oranges discerned more
readily as a different fruit. This extrinsic or objective analysis takes as
its starting point the figurative “four corners” of the work, or what we
might call the bounds of the work when it is not textual or paginated.
The work serves as the source of interpretive authority, thus minimizing the amount of evidence required at that stage and narrowing the
grounds available for dispute. Even if judges adopt an approach on the
Analysis/Intuition axis that favors intuition, as long as they are focused on the text alone, the playing field is clear from the beginning,
and the boundaries of the judgment are thus somewhat clearer than
they would be under an approach that treated text and context with
equal discretion.
However, under this Article’s proposed approach, judges are advised to choose analysis over intuition. There are many virtues to acknowledging that intuition plays a part in copyright law at present,
from the “total concept and feel” test and the lay observer standard to
instances in which judges make pronouncements on doctrinal matters
without referring to anything more than their own intuition. Yet there
are more virtues still to minimizing its role as much as possible going
forward. For one thing, the confusion surrounding the “total concept
and feel” test has converted it into an element that judges consider,
when in fact it makes little sense to refer to the holistic aspects of a
work’s impression in terms that put that perception of the whole on
par with the individual elements such as plot, characters, and setting,
which are indisputably part of the work. For another thing, what one
judge finds intuitive may differ considerably from what another finds
intuitive; it is axiomatic that an intuitive understanding may and often
does diverge from descriptive and normative understanding. Finally,
when a judge relies on intuition alone, it is difficult for subsequent
courts to reconsider the issue on appeal.
Consequently, this Article calls for text-based formalism. Formalism, in general, is rule-based, rather than standards-based301 and seeks
to minimize flexibility and maximize predictability.302 No interpretive
method guarantees perfect predictability, of course. However, a method, such as text-based formalism, that emphasizes the same starting
300. See Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1367 (N.D. Ga.
2001), vacated, 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Such lists, however, are inherently
subjective and unreliable, particularly where the list contains random similarities, and many
such similarities could be found in very dissimilar works.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
301. Jeffrey Malkan, Literary Formalism, Legal Formalism, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.1393
(1998).
302. Fredrick Schauer, On Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 539 (1988).
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point each time — the work or text at issue — and the same modes of
procedure within that work, will create greater consistency across cases. Judges can use formalism to weed out non-meritorious cases, or
cases that are perhaps easy ones, lacking questions of fact about context, intention, and other complicating factors. Simply producing a
“close reading” of both texts will often suffice to resolve the question.
Explicitly acknowledging that they are applying a formalist or fourcorners type of lens will curtail the fallacy that the work “speaks for
itself,” which has in the past operated as a trump card to exclude other
interpretive approaches, and extrinsic evidence.303 Texts are not selfinterpreting but require interpretive engagement of judges. Formalism
brings judicial analysis to the surface, forcing judges to produce a
record of analysis that is more objective than a hunch about the works
in question.
The formalism that would best serve copyright by producing the
greatest predictability is a text-based formalism that emphasizes procedure, consistent reason giving, and process- rather than outcomedriven reasoning. To the extent that this text-based formalism creates
a mandate that judges “give reasons,” it creates commitments for the
future, thus imposing a new set of constraints. If predictability and
consistency are two of the key goals to keep in mind for improving
copyright’s infringement analysis, a shift to text-based formalism will
work best.
Formalism is not, however, without drawbacks. The cost of using
rules rather than standards is often loss of tailoring, and it can sometimes create unfairness.304 If judges explicitly adopt formalism in their
resolution of questions of law, they will need some fallback or nextlevel mechanism for what happens when formalism does not sufficiently resolve the questions at bar. However, the need to move past
formalism can be anticipated based on the types of work at issue and
the specific facts in play. If parties believe a formalist approach will
miss crucial elements of the litigation, they can brief the court accordingly and signal to the judge that the case is one that should not be
resolved as a matter of law, nor on a solely formalist basis. For instance, they may point to expert depositions or even prior scholarship
to indicate that expert opinions should be central to disposition of a
case, or they may flag complex questions of fact that make pre-trial
disposition improper. Where formalism appears inadequate, say, in
cases requiring additional context or resolution of factual disputes, a

303. See supra Part III.A.
304. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 607, 621 (1992); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term —
Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–65 (1992); Cass
R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953, 957–58 (1995).
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fuller trial is, in any event, appropriate, as the rules around summary
judgment already reflect.305
Text-based formalism’s virtues, if deployed in the way this Article envisions, include offering defendants a more predictable and
streamlined way to cut off litigation pre-trial because of a rebuttable
presumption that judges, as a matter of law, could properly resolve a
matter on the basis of objective or extrinsic analysis alone. Resolving
disputes earlier on will help minimize costs to the parties and take
pressure off the judicial docket by obviating the need for trial or for
additional evidence on summary judgment motions. Additionally,
explicitly relying on formalism will improve predictability and transparency: Parties can anticipate that judicial focus will be on the works
themselves and on analysis of their structures, themes, and concrete
elements, rather than on a malleable, unpredictable impression of the
works. The shift to a more objective standard of analysis makes sense
in light of the increased reliance on summary judgment as a dispute
resolution mechanism.306 Historically, courts withheld summary
judgment in copyright cases because of the concern that judges would
have to wade into subjective analysis of similarity.307 Though it is
now well-settled that courts may find non-infringement as a matter of
law on a motion of summary judgment,308 such determinations are
limited to cases in which only uncopyrightable elements have been
copied or because the two works at issue are objectively not substantially similar: No reasonable juror could find otherwise.309 For all the
foregoing reasons, when interpreting works at stages in which issues
exist as questions of law judges should default to formalism as a clear,
predictable, rule-based interpretive method, whose analysis has the
greatest capacity to be objective, efficient, and transparent.
C. Text-Based Formalism by Itself May Not Suffice
In certain cases, however, text-based formalism will not be the interpretive method best suited to achieve predictability, transparency,
and fairness. Specifically, when questions of fact arise, formalism
ceases to be the ideal default interpretive method. This is because
some doctrines will require fact-finding (on questions of access and
copying, for instance) or call for extensive inquiry into potentially
subjective questions (such as an author’s intent, the meaning of an
unclear scope of assignment of copyright, or an audience’s reception
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
306. Patricia M. Wald, Summary Judgment at Sixty, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1913 (2007).
307. See Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980).
308. E.g., Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63–64
(2d Cir. 2010); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 231, 240 (2d Cir.1983); see
also 3-12 NIMMER § 12.10.
309. Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999).
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of a work). Certain doctrines may, in fact, require particular lenses,
and in those cases contextualism may be more procedurally burdensome but fairer than formalism. Thus, there are many doctrines in
which text-based formalism alone may not render a fair or thoroughly
reasoned decision.
For instance, when judges consider issues of joint authorship,
works made for hire, and transfers and assignments of copyright, they
are very likely to encounter uncertainties that go beyond the four corners of the given works. Disputes may touch on the works’ similarities, and to that extent an explicitly formalist lens still makes sense on
those issues. But the broader range of issues implicated will include
authorial intention, employment conditions, contracts, targeted audience, and so on. Judges adjudicating questions not amenable to textbased formalist approaches may consider intentionalism, institutionalism, contextualism, or some mix of those approaches.310
An interesting test case lies in interpretive methods used to determine fair use. The range of possible fair use cases is great, and
some uses are much more clearly fair than others.311 In some cases,
the strong speech interests involved in fair use litigation would support a robust formalist approach that allows a judge to determine
whether a use was fair on the basis of his or her objective analysis of
the works alone. Such a clear, rule-based approach to the doctrine
would help defendants with stronger constitutional interests, for example, because their use is for news reporting or is clearly noncommercial.312 Yet the backdrop of fair use cases shows that, in many
of them, formalism could prove to be a poor fit because fair use often
requires discovery and resolution of mixed questions of law and
fact.313 The nature and purpose of the use, which drives the first prong
of fair use analysis,314 is sometimes not readily visible under a formalist approach. Sometimes it reveals itself under contextualist analysis
(looking at genre or audience reception by a particular interpretive
community to which the judge is not privy); sometimes it can be informed by statements of authorial intention, expert opinions, or greater information, generally, all of which lie outside the text.315 Indeed,
fair use is often considered a question of mixed fact and law and his310. See Yen, supra note 10.
311. For instance, to the extent that the use of a work falls within those uses specifically
enumerated in the preamble to 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), which includes “criticism, comment,
news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research,” that use will more easily be found to
be “fair.”
312. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 540 (1985);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
313. See Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731, 735 (2d Cir. 1991).
314. Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 608 (2d Cir. 2006)
(“Most important to the court’s analysis of the first factor is the ‘transformative’ nature of
the work.”).
315. See supra, Part II.E (discussing the Text/Context axis).
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torically tended to be almost exclusively the province of the factfinder.316 Quite plainly, the statute itself incorporates a formalist analysis in its asking about the amount of work borrowed, but it just as
plainly calls for moving beyond the text to the author’s purpose, and
to the effect of the work’s publication on the relevant market.317 Because of its sensitivity to findings of fact, fair use may be a poor candidate for a text-based formalist approach designed to cull cases at
early stages, using rules and narrowing the scope of judicial inquiry.318 Finally, an undeniable part of fair use’s power lies in its ability to bless what might have looked like infringing cutting-edge
technologies and forms of avant-garde expression. When the boundaries between new and old are evolving and uncertain, a rules-based
approach without flexibility may not adhere to copyright’s larger
mandate to promote progress. It may trade clarity for adaptability and
fairness. Thus, judges in fair use cases would do well to rely less
heavily on text-based formalism, and litigants would do well to expect
that many fair use cases will require broadening beyond the narrow
scope of the work alone.
Under a text-based formalism, judges would begin with formalist
analysis and, only if necessary, proceed to a second tier of more factintensive analysis. Intuition could play a role, but only in realms appropriate for intuition alone, say, for instance, in the lay observer
standard which is applied by the fact-finder. In the second tier of
analysis, judges could select from contextualist, intentionalist, and
other approaches to interpreting the works. Such an approach would
make clear what methodology was being used and shine light on
methodological abdication or unprincipled intuitionism when it occurs. At times, judges simply conclude an issue, offering little other
than an announcement with no method apparent or reasoning offered.319 This has received some attention in the scholarship but could
continue to benefit from further theorization.320
Perhaps, as a policy matter, the lay observer standard is appropriate for judicial intuitionism when judges, as fact-finders, substitute
their judgment for that of the jury. This may be “a decision-making
environment,” like those in which, as Professor Schauer has written, it
may be normatively a good thing for decision makers not to have to

316. Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 DENVER U. L. REV. 1 (2012).
317. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
318. See Salinger v. Colting, 641 F. Supp. 2d 250, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“In applying the
fair use doctrine ‘[t]he task is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis’ and ‘all [of the four factors] are to
be explored, and the results weighed together in light of the purposes of copyright.’”),
vacated, 607 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 577–78 (1994)).
319. See supra Part II.D.
320. See Lemley, supra note 40, at 729–30.
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give reasons.321 If giving reasons means giving commitments, then
perhaps it would overly constrain future judges to be bound to particular methods in arriving at a conclusion purporting to capture the lay
observer’s perspective. Yet the problem with the current thinking is
that intuitionism does effectively already make a choice. By assuming
that they can discern the lay observer’s view of the works based on
their own intuitive responses to the works before them, judges make a
methodological choice. Such judges may not have given a reason, but
at some level of generality they have made a kind of commitment.
That commitment is to a standard that broadly accords judges the discretion to fill it through intuitive analysis. When one chooses an intuitive methodological approach, one is necessarily choosing it over othother approaches.322
Because intuitionism is a method (of sorts), but an extremely manipulable one that is difficult to evaluate on appeal, it ought to arise
only in cases in which there is a strong argument that other methods
are inadequate, from a text-based formalism perspective. A shift to an
intuitionist method should not arise out of an outcome-determinative
analysis that finds that, for example, a holistic approach is the sole
way to arrive at a finding of infringement (as it was in Roth, the case
that has come to stand for the total concept and feel test).323 If intuitionism adds depth or nuance to an already robust analysis, it may,
perhaps, have some value for judicial reasoning.
In sum, judges are the proper authority to make decisions of interpretive choice in copyright law. When they confront matters of law,
judges should adopt formalism unless the parties can rebut the presumption that formalism should operate, either by showing that a
question of fact exists that would trigger a shift in method or by showing that formalism will fail to capture some crucial aspect of the case.
Nonetheless, judges should acknowledge the limits of formalism;
sometimes other methods will be required, as when matters of fact
arise or when doctrines arise that inherently require inquiry beyond
the text, thus minimizing the utility of formalism. Judges should still
be empowered to decide, as a matter of law, that a different interpretive method is required and to acknowledge an occasionally inevitable
broadening of scope. With greater guidance of interpretive choice in
copyright law steering judicial analysis increasingly toward text-based
formalism, outcomes can be more transparent, predictable, consistent,

321. Schauer, supra note 11, at 634 (“[M]any decisionmaking environments eschew the
very feature that the conventional picture of legal decisionmaking takes as an essential
component of rationality.”).
322. Said, supra note 28, at 365 (“If one can be said to grasp an image’s meaning
immediately upon receipt, one necessarily implies that the work’s critical reception, its
genre, and its author’s intention matter less, if at all.”).
323. See supra Part II.D.
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and logical. Perhaps these preceding qualities will also increase fairness.

V. CONCLUSION
Judges in copyright adjudication face numerous, inevitable, and
difficult interpretive questions. Specifically, at recurring interpretive
pressure points in their analysis judges must decide what interpretive
methods to use, just as they would if they were adjudicating legally
determinative textual objects such as contracts. Judges focus on certain sources for their interpretive authority, locating their choices
somewhere along the Text/Context axis. They then deploy certain
interpretive methods, somewhere along the Analysis/Intuition axis.
This Article has shown how these choices implicate larger theoretical
questions with real legal significance for outcomes. Far from having
answered these questions, copyright scholarship has not yet really
asked them in any systematic way. Moreover, these interpretive questions are not issues that arise in only a narrow stratum of difficult cases. They arise in all copyright cases, just as interpretive questions can
exist in all cases concerning contracts, wills, statutes,324 and the Constitution; indeed, just as in those other areas, questions of interpretive
method are often the hardest issues to decide. In that sense, copyright
law is not meaningfully different from these other areas of law.
Copyright law requires judges to act with interpretive precision,
but it denies them meaningful, consistent guidance. It also empowers
them to act with considerable discretion with regards to the interpretive methods they use. Their decisions as to their interpretive authority
are not made on the surface, and thus they are not explicitly reviewed
on appeal.
Streamlining and clarifying copyright adjudication through the
adoption of defaults to the text over its context, and to analysis over
intuition, could serve the values of transparency, predictability, efficiency, and fairness. This would effectively reflect a shift from interpretive chaos to interpretive order, from interpretive standards to
interpretive rules. Additional changes could be contemplated in the
rules around expert evidence. Many possible solutions exist. At a
higher level of abstraction, any systematic change will require a jurisprudentially informed discussion of the desirable scope of judicial
authority as well as the tradeoffs of rules versus standards. At a much
more immediate level, it requires awareness that what judges do with
324. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 274; Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1998); Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract
Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749 (2000); Robert E.
Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 847 (2000);
Michael Sinclair, The Proper Treatment of “Interpretive Choice” in Statutory DecisionMaking, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 389 (2002).
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the works they adjudicate in copyright cases is, like the works themselves, interpretively complex. Accordingly, interpretive choice
should be understood to be a key part of the judicial work in copyright
cases, thus meriting sustained scholarly attention and greater judicial
awareness. Once it is acknowledged that interpretive pressure points
are built into copyright law, the question of how judges do — and
perhaps how they should — decide among interpretive approaches
can rise to the surface. Where they fall along the Text/Context and
Analysis/Intuition axes often matters to outcomes and should therefore be subject to the same sorts of rules that govern other factors that
affect outcomes. At present, judges possess great discretion over their
interpretive method selection, and the lack of any constraints mandating transparency or guiding their decision-making creates inconsistency and unpredictability. Accordingly, this Article addressed the
benefits of a turn to text-based adjudication and analysis rather than
intuition in the form of a two-tiered analysis. Under this proposal,
judges would begin with text-based formalism to review issues arising
as a matter of law, and then only move beyond formalism in cases
where such an expansion is warranted and can be argued by the parties or decided and justified by a judge.

